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This Article challenges the conceptualization of adhesive forms as contracts
and introduces a taxonomy of adhesive terms. It argues that this classification
system should be used to determine which adhesive terms are in fact contractual
rather than depending upon the self-serving “contracts” label that businesses use
to identify their terms. Even if contract law is not the proper framework, torts,
property, and other legal and regulatory regimes may determine the enforceability
and effect of adhesive terms.
Thus, this Article is both a deconstruction of standard form contracts and
a reconstruction. Courts typically apply the standard of reasonable notice to
assess the enforceability of adhesive online terms. This Article proposes that
online “reasonable notices” be limited to three lines of text with five words each
or five lines of text with three words each. The proposed requirements ensure
that online reasonable notices are both conspicuous and comprehensible to the
average consumer.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The world’s largest corporations have used the smallest
instruments to help them establish and maintain their empires.
Referred to by different names—terms of service, fine print, wrap
contracts, boilerplate, legalese—it is their diminutive and unassuming
nature that makes their power so easy to underestimate. Easily
overlooked, never read, these terms bite hardest when least expected.
The New York Times’s editorial board lamented the power of big tech
companies being made even more powerful through “lopsided
consumer contracts.”1 Big tech companies deploy terms of service or
“TOS”2 against businesses, too, and across the political spectrum. For
example, when Amazon terminated Parler—a social media app
popular with Trump supporters—from its cloud hosting services, it did
so under the authority of its terms of service.3 It was a controversial
1
N.Y. Times Ed. Bd., What Happens When You Click ‘Agree’?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/23/opinion/sunday/online-terms-ofservice.html.
2
Companies may use variations, such as “Terms of Use” or “Conditions of Use.”
For convenience, and because there does not seem to be any reason for the differing
terminology or for the use of or non-use of capitalization, I will refer to all these
variations as “terms of service” or “TOS” except where included as part of a quoted
passage.
3
Tony Romm & Rachel Lerman, Amazon Suspends Parler, Taking Pro-Trump Site
Offline
Indefinitely,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
11,
2021,
5:12
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/09/amazon-parlersuspension. Parler subsequently retained web hosting services from another company.
Bobby Allyn & Rachel Treisman, After Weeks of Being Offline, Parler Finds a New Web Host,
NPR (Feb. 15, 2021, 4:32 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/15/968116346/afterweeks-of-being-off-line-parler-finds-a-new-web-host. The terms of service of that
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move that sparked a discussion about the power of tech platforms over
speech.4
Amazon is not alone in turning to its terms of service to protect
and defend its business decisions.
Facebook demanded that
researchers at New York University stop collecting data about its
practices involving targeted political ads, claiming that the research
project violated the company’s terms of service.5 Google tried to justify
its data collection practices by claiming users “consented” to them
when they agreed to its terms of service.6 When Robinhood shut down
trading in Gamestop’s volatile stock, its users lost a lot of money.7 They
sued, but in January 2022, a federal judge dismissed a class action
lawsuit against the company largely because its Customer Agreement
expressly permits Robinhood to halt trading.8
These are only a representative sampling of the ways in which fine
print controls our lives and, especially, our online activity. Firms
impose a wide range of terms upon their customers. These terms are
presented in a variety of forms and formats both online and offline.
company are similar to those provided by Amazon. See SkySilk, Inc. Terms & Conditions,
SKYSILK, INC., https://www.skysilk.com/terms (last visited Sept. 15, 2022) (“SkySilk
reserves the right to remove prohibited materials along with associated User accounts
without warning or notification to the User”); Acceptable Use Policy, SKYSILK, INC.,
https://www.skysilk.com/aup (last visited Sept. 15, 2022) (“We reserve the right to
take immediate action to suspend or terminate your account if, in our sole and
exclusive discretion, you are engaging in activities that jeopardize our security, the
security of other customers, or of the internet in general. You may not be provided
with advance notice that we are taking such action.”).
4
Parler sued Amazon but subsequently dropped the lawsuit and refiled in state
court. Russell Brandom, Parler Drops Federal Lawsuit Against Amazon—but Files Another
in State Court, VERGE (Mar. 3, 2021, 7:19 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2021/3/3
/22310873/parler-amazon-aws-lawsuit-antitrust-hosting-free-speech.
5
Jeff Horwitz, Facebook Seeks Shutdown of NYU Research Project into Political Ad
Targeting; In Letter this Month, Facebook Says the Project Violates Provisions in its Terms of
Service That Prohibit Bulk Data Collection, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-seeks-shutdown-of-nyu-research-project-intopolitical-ad-targeting-11603488533.
6
Calhoun v. Google, LLC, 526 F. Supp. 3d 605, 620 (N.D. Cal. 2021); see id. at 623
(rejecting Google’s argument).
7
See Chris Dolmetsch, Robinhood Users Suing Over Trade Limits Face High Legal Bar
(3), BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 28, 2021, 10:02 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-lawweek/robinhood-customers-sue-over-removal-of-gamestop.
8
In re Jan. 2021 Short Squeeze Trading, 584 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1186 (S.D. Fla.
2022) (“Every investor who uses Robinhood’s platform agrees to enter a contract – the
Customer Agreement. The Customer Agreement permits Robinhood Securities and
Robinhood Financial to restrict trading….California law favors contract law over tort
law as an avenue for allocating economic losses absent extraordinary circumstances.”).
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Some of them are signed, but many more are posted on walls, inserted
in mailers and packages, and displayed on websites and smartphones.
These terms are adhesive, meaning that they are offered on a take-itor-leave-it basis, and the customer is unable to negotiate modifications.
Should all these terms be legally binding? And are they contracts?
Courts once struggled with the concept of non-negotiated
standard forms as contracts but eventually accepted them as valid
contracting forms. They cobbled together rules and standards in an
effort to balance fairness with efficiency and meet the needs of an
evolving marketplace. They did so, however, without a clear picture of
how the pieces might fit together. The result is doctrinal chaos, a
hodgepodge of rules and standards governing adhesive form contracts
that undermine both fairness and predictability.
The legal fiction that finds that the imposition of adhesive terms
equals contractual assent ignores the centrality of consent to contract
law. To put it plainly, to allow the stronger party to characterize the
forced imposition of adhesive terms as a contract is akin to allowing a
robber to call a mugging a donation because the victim has not resisted
enough. This is not to suggest that all adhesive contracts are
tantamount to state-sanctioned stealing; rather, it is to make a point
that should be obvious but is too often simply overlooked—a contract
is a creature of law and, as such, it must meet certain requirements. If
it does not, it is not a contract despite what one party may call it.
The problem of adhesive terms is not just a matter of annoying
fine print, but a pressing matter of social and economic equality.
Oppressive terms harm most those who lack market power, media
savvy, language fluency, or time to interact with or maneuver around
legal departments and customer service representatives.9 They are
more likely to be ignored or dismissed by companies who may know—
by accessing their credit score, zip code, or income level—that a
caller’s options are limited. Furthermore, people may assume that a
contract is enforceable even when it is not. Consequently, contract
formation often means submission to the terms even if the terms could
be successfully challenged.10
9

See Yonathan A. Arbel & Roy Shapira, Theory of the Nudnik: The Future of Consumer
Activism and What We Can Do to Stop It, 73 VAND. L. REV. 929, 929–30 (2020) (identifying
a small subset of consumers who may receive special treatment because of their
willingness to complain).
10
See Meirav Furth-Matzkin, The Harmful Effects of Unenforceable Contracts Terms:
Experimental Evidence, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1031, 1039 (2019) (finding that unenforceable
terms in rental agreements have an adverse effect on tenants’ decisions because they
are often unaware of their rights); Meirav Furth-Matzkin & Roseanna Sommers,
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This Article seeks to move beyond the debate regarding the
desirability of “standard form contracts.” To refer to standard form
contracts is to acknowledge their form as contracts. On the other
hand, to reject standard form contracts entirely because of their
adhesive nature is to ignore the advantages of adhesive terms.
Although many scholars have written about adhesive form
contracts and terms of service,11 this Article is the first to dissect the
nature of adhesive terms. Thus, this Article is both a deconstruction
of standard form contracts and a reconceptualization. Specifically, I
make three novel contributions to the existing literature. First, I
propose a cross-doctrinal regime that aligns more appropriately with
underlying doctrinal objectives. I then introduce a taxonomy of
adhesive terms that reflects this new regime. Finally, I propose
minimum requirements for reasonable notices.
This Article is organized as follows: Part II critically examines the
case law in the area of standard form contracts. It explains how courts
have confused contracts with notices and conflated the law governing
notices and disclosures with the law of contracts. Part III seeks to
provide clarity regarding the nature of adhesive terms by introducing
a taxonomy of adhesive terms. Adhesive terms fall into an array of
different categories, which include notices, disclaimers, waivers,
unilateral contracts, licenses, quasi-contracts, and implied-in-fact
contracts. Courts have failed to distinguish these categories of
adhesive terms and instead, have relied upon legal fictions to enforce
adhesive terms as contracts. Adhesive terms are usually not contracts.
Some adhesive terms, however, may still have legal effect even though
they are not contractually binding. Instead of treating all adhesive terms
Consumer Psychology and the Problem of Fine-Print Fraud, 72 STAN. L. REV. 503, 508 (2020)
(finding that laypeople, unlike lawyers, “strongly believe that fraudulent fine print is
consented to and will be enforced”); Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott & Norman Bishara, The
Behavioral Effects of (Unenforceable) Contracts, 36 J.L., ECON., AND ORG. 633 (2020)
(finding that employees with non-competes even in states where they are
unenforceable cite them as a reason for declining offers from competitors).
11
See generally Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting
in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2002); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943);
Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970); Mark A. Lemley,
Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459 (2006); MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE
FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts
of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983). Much of the recent
scholarship focuses on specific terms given bargaining power disparities. See Mark A.
Lemley, The Benefit of the Bargain (Stanford L. and Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 575,
2022) (proposing that default contract rules cannot be varied in a standard form).
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as “contracts” subject to contract law, the appropriate legal and
doctrinal response should depend upon the nature of the term and
the drafter’s authority to impose it. Part IV proposes specific
requirements for reasonable notice that reflect common industry and
design principles and align with the behavior of actual (not fictitious)
reasonable online users. Part V concludes.
II. CONTRACT LAW IN A DYNAMIC MARKETPLACE
The form of contracts evolved with changes in the marketplace.
With industrialization and the mass production of goods came mass
produced standard form contracts. The alterations of the contractual
form made transactions more efficient. Sellers did not have to
negotiate each contract, and they could streamline the way they did
business by standardizing processes and terms. But the standard form
contract did not reflect the ideals of contract law. Rather, it reflected
the unilateral exercise of market power. As the Supreme Court of New
Jersey in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. wrote:
The traditional contract is the result of free bargaining of
parties who are brought together by the play of the market,
and who meet each other on a footing of approximate economic equality. In such a society there is no danger that freedom of contract will be a threat to the social order as a whole.
But in present-day commercial life the standardized mass
contract has appeared. It is used primarily by enterprises
with strong bargaining power and position . . . Such standardized contracts have been described as those in which one
predominant party will dictate its law to an undetermined
multiple rather than to an individual. They are said to resemble a law rather than a meeting of the minds.12
The most recent alteration to the form of a contract arrived with
computers and the digital age. Contracts were no longer limited by
their physical, tangible form. Terms could be presented in different
formats and through different delivery mechanisms. Any digital device
could be a tool for contracting. As a result, businesses started to
impose terms upon consumers that they labeled as contractual and
that they claimed were legally binding.13

12

Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86 (N.J. 1960).
See Robin Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning
Analysis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1135, 1140 (2019) (“At first slowly and imperceptibly, but
now with mounting speed and generality, many courts and legal analysts have
responded to the expanding uses of boilerplate text in the digital age by diminishing
13
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Today, these online “contracts” are ubiquitous, and their terms
are voluminous, onerous, and complex. Because they are practically
costless to reproduce and update, businesses use them more frequently
and alter them often.14 Digitization removed the barriers that formerly
restrained businesses from making their contracts too lengthy and
from using them too often. In order to justify enforcing these terms
as contracts, courts resorted to the legal fiction of constructive assent,
which in turn spawned its own fictions of constructive notice and the
reasonable internet user15 that resembled no actual living person, as
explained in the next Section.
A. Adhesive Terms as Contracts and Other Legal Fictions
Contract law adopts an objective theory of interpretation, which
means that whether the parties have entered into a contract depends
on their outward manifestations.16 These outward manifestations are
usually spoken or written words, but they can also be deeds or
conduct.17 The objective standard, however, only applies where the
offeree knows that an offer has been made. If the offeree is unaware
that any offer is made, then the objective standard does not apply to
the offeree’s conduct.18 Accordingly, the recipient of adhesive terms
is not bound by an act that may seem like a manifestation of consent if
the recipient is unaware of contractual terms and the terms are
inconspicuous and not obviously contractual.19
the type of agreement . . . required to produce ‘terms’ and ‘contracts.’”) Kar and
Radin refer to modern day adhesive contracts as “pseudo contracts.” Id.
14
I have written about the impact of digitization on contract’s form elsewhere so
will only briefly summarize them in this Article. See generally NANCY S. KIM, WRAP
CONTRACTS (2013); Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797 (2007);
Nancy S. Kim, The Duty to Draft Reasonably and Online Contracts, in COMMERCIAL
CONTRACT LAW: TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES 181 (Larry Di Matteo et al. eds., 2013).
15
See HomeAdvisor, Inc. v. Waddell, No. 05-19-00669-CV, 2020 WL 2988565, at *4
(Tex. App. June 4, 2020) (applying the “reasonably prudent computer or smartphone
user” standard to assess whether a contract was formed).
16
Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 987, 992 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1972) (“It is true that the terms of a contract ordinarily are to be determined by
an external, not an internal, standard; the outward manifestation or expression of
assent is the controlling factor.”).
17
See id.
18
Id. at 993 (“[W]hen the offeree does not know that a proposal has been made
to him this objective standard does not apply.”).
19
Id. (“[A]n offeree, regardless of apparent manifestation of his consent, is not
bound by inconspicuous contractual provisions of which he was unaware, contained
in a document whose contractual nature is not obvious.”).
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In other words, a court must decide whether an offer has been
made before determining that the offeree accepted it. The inquiry thus
requires two parts: First, the court must use an objective standard to
assess the form of the adhesive terms to determine whether a
reasonable offeree would think, given the presentation of the terms,
that an offer had been made. Second, the court must use an objective
standard to assess the conduct of the offeree to determine whether a
reasonable person in the offeror’s shoes would think that the offeree
had manifested consent.
If the contract looks like a contract—meaning that it is printed on
paper, identified textually as a contract, and formatted the way
contracts are typically formatted—then the first issue is easily
addressed. If the offeree then signs the contract, the second step of
the inquiry is also resolved.
Courts skirt the issue of consent by applying an objective standard
to the offeree’s actions and imposing the duty to read. The duty to read
charges a party who signed a contract with knowledge of its terms.20
Notwithstanding the name, there is no real duty; rather, there is a
presumption that someone who signs a contract has read the terms it
contains. 21
The duty to read may be appropriate where the agreement is
negotiated but is incongruous in light of the no-reading problem.22
Imposing the duty to read on adherents to mass market adhesive form
contracts is unfair because most adherents are consumers who are not

20

See Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc. v. Benco Contracting and Eng’g, Inc., 89 Cal.
App. 4th 1042, 1049 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“A party cannot avoid the terms of a contract
on the ground that he or she failed to read it before signing.”).
21
The so-called “duty to read” refers to the understanding that someone who signs
a contract is charged with knowing what the contracts says. See generally Charles L.
Knapp, Is There a “Duty to Read”?, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1083 (2015) (discussing the meaning
of a duty to read).
22
See Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law,
66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 546 (2014) (referring to consumers failure to read form contracts
as the “no-reading problem”). As Tal Kastner and Ethan J. Leib note, the application
of rules intended for one type of contract often “creep” over and are applied to other
types of contracts for which they are ill-suited. Tal Kastner & Ethan J. Leib, Contract
Creep, 107 GEO. L.J. 1277, 1279 (2019). They write that the doctrinal rules and
distinctions “from commercial settings and highly negotiated contracts between
sophisticated parties [have creeped] into the realm of consumer contract.” Id. at 1303.
The authors explain that each of “these ‘creeping’ doctrines . . . [emerge] with a
rationale grounded in a particular transactional structure that creeps into applications
in different transaction types.” Id.
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represented by counsel, and most form contracts are lengthy and filled
with legalese.23
Courts, recognizing the potential for abuse by businesses, temper
the power firms have to unilaterally draft terms by policing the terms
with doctrines such as good faith, unconscionability, and reasonable
expectations.24 As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated, “[t]he task of
the judiciary is to administer the spirit as well as the letter of the law
. . . . [P]art of that burden is to protect the ordinary man against the
loss of important rights through what, in effect, is the unilateral act of
the manufacturer.”25
Courts apply rules differently depending on the type of contract.
For example, some courts recognize an exception to the duty to read
with insurance contracts where an insured has reasonably relied upon
an agent’s representations.26 The Arizona Supreme Court, in
overriding an insured’s duty to read, stated that “the usual insurance
policy is a special kind of contract” because it is “largely adhesive; some
terms are bargained for, but most terms consist of boilerplate, not
bargained for, neither read nor understood by the buyer, and often
not even fully understood by the selling agent.”27
Courts require that certain terms be drawn to the user’s attention.
For example, the California Court of Appeal required that terms of a
warranty disclaimer be “apparent,” which meant something more than
simply “conspicuous.”28 It further suggested that the drafter should
23

Cf. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CALIF. L. REV. 305, 305 (1986).
Most readers will have personal experience not reading contracts. Melvin Eisenberg
writes that “it is reasonable” for “consumers who are faced with the dense text of form
contracts” to “respond by refusing to read.” Id.
24
Cf. Danielle Kie Hart, In and Out–Contract Doctrines in Action, 66 HASTINGS L.J.
1661, 1661 (2015) (finding, based on an analysis of cases from the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits, that “it may not be so easy to get into a contract,” but that once in, “it is
extremely difficult to get out” of a contract).
25
Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 94.
26
Filip v. Block, 879 N.E.2d 1076, 1084 (Ind. 2008) (noting that “‘reasonable
reliance upon an agent’s representations can override an insured’s duty to read the
policy.’” (quoting Vill. Furniture, Inc. v. Assoc. Ins. Managers, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 306,
308 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989))).
27
Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 395
(Ariz. 1984).
28
See A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 490 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982) (“Although the printing used on the warranty disclaimer was conspicuous …,
the terms of the consequential damage exclusion are not particularly apparent, being
only slightly larger than most of the other contract text. Both provisions appear in the
middle of the back page of a long, preprinted form contract . . . [i]t was never
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advise the adherent to read the terms to avoid unfair surprise and that
“[t]he burden should be on the party submitting [a standard contract]
in printed form to show that the other party had knowledge of any
unusual or unconscionable terms contained therein.”29
Similarly, in Sutton v. David Stanley Chevrolet, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court determined that a car dealership that did not point
out a dispute resolution clause to a customer could not enforce that
clause against the customer.30 The clause was contained in a two-page
purchase agreement right above a signature line; however, the
circumstances gave rise to a “duty to disclose” on the part of the
defendant.31 The court noted that unlike the other provisions, which
contained information regarding either the vehicle or the customer,
the dispute resolution provision was a “totally unrelated provision,”
which was “tucked-in right before the apparent signature line for the
trade-in vehicle section” and was in a “much smaller font size.”32 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that:
[T]he representations of the finance manager combined
with the structure of the purchase agreement created a false
impression that the purpose of Sutton’s signature was to only
verify information concerning his trade-in vehicle. He surely
was not under the impression he was agreeing to waive his
right to a jury trial and obligating himself to pay a share of
the costs of arbitration when he signed underneath the tradein vehicle section of the purchase agreement. The DRC
which provided for arbitration was a material provision of the
purchase agreement. Because of the creation of the false impression which shrouded the existence of the DRC, a duty to
disclose this material provision arose.33

suggested to him, either verbally or in writing, that he read the back of the form . . .
He certainly had the opportunity to read the back of the contract or to seek the advice
of a lawyer. Yet as a factual matter, given the complexity of the terms and FMC’s failure
to direct his attention to them, Abatti’s omission may not be totally unreasonable.”)
(footnote omitted).
29
Id. (quoting Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 1971)).
30
475 P.3d 847, 858 (Okla. 2020).
31
Id. at 850–861 (“Under the circumstances of the present case, a duty arose to
inform Sutton of the DRC. This is due to the false impression created by both the
finance manager and the structure of the purchase agreement itself.”).
32
Id. at 857.
33
Id.
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs’ failure to read
the finely printed dispute resolution clause was “no defense” for the
defendant and did not affect the defendant’s duty to disclose.34
1. “Reasonable Communicativeness” and the “Notice and
Manifestation” Tests
The way that contract law treats adhesive terms depends upon
both the form in which the terms are presented and the substance of
the terms. The most important aspect of form is whether the adherent
signed the adhesive terms and acknowledged them as legally binding.
If the form is signed, then the analysis tends to focus on the substance
of the terms and whether they should be enforceable. If the adherent
does not sign the form, then courts must determine whether a contract
was even formed. Typically, they resort to constructive assent
approaches and a myriad of standards depending on the context. Not
surprisingly, this is where doctrinal analysis tends to get murky.
Courts developed two different tests to assess assent to standard
forms where the adherent did not sign and the adhesive terms were
presented in a form that was not obviously contractual, such as tickets.
The first was the “reasonable communicativeness” test. 35 This test has
two prongs: First, the court will examine the “physical characteristics”
of the ticket and whether the terms were conspicuous and readable.36
Second, the court determines whether the recipient had the ability to
be “meaningfully informed” and the opportunity to reject the terms.37
In Sgouros v. Transunion Corp., the Seventh Circuit stated that the
two-part reasonable communicativeness test “(t)ranslated to the
Internet” would require asking
whether the web pages presented to the consumer adequately communicate all the terms and conditions of the
agreement, and whether the circumstances support the assumption that the purchaser receives reasonable notice of
34

Id. at 857–58.
See Deiro v. American Airlines, Inc., 816 F.2d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting
that the “Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have also adopted this ‘reasonable
communicativeness’ test” for passenger tickets).
36
Baer v. Silversea Cruises Ltd., 752 Fed. App’x. 861, 864–65 (11th Cir. 2018)
(noting that the “reasonable communicativeness” test has two prongs: “First, courts
look to the physical characteristics of the limitations provision, including the size of
the text, its conspicuousness, and its typeface. The second prong analyzes whether the
passenger ‘had the ability to become meaningfully informed of the clause and to reject
its terms.’”) (citations omitted).
37
Id.
35
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those terms. This is a fact intensive inquiry: we cannot presume that a person who clicks on a box that appears on a
computer screen has notice of all contents not only of that
page but of other content that requires further action (scrolling, following a link, etc.) Indeed a person using the Internet may not realize that she is agreeing to a contract at all,
whereas a reasonable person signing a physical contract will
rarely be unaware of that fact.38
Many courts have ignored the reasonable communicativeness test
altogether with internet contracts and applied a different test.39 I refer
to this second test as the “notice-and-manifestation” test. Although
there is no clear consensus on its precise articulation, this test includes
some variant of “reasonable notice” or “conspicuous notice” and
“manifestation of consent” or “manifestation of assent.” Many courts
add the additional requirement of an “opportunity to reject.” The
notice and manifestation test arose in the context of digital goods, such
as prepackaged software, where terms were enclosed in plastic wrap.
The standard became more prevalent with the internet. Online, where
there is no option to sign, courts have determined that a
“manifestation of consent” could be something other than a signature;
it could be a click on an icon that expresses acceptance. Because
people click for many different reasons online—including habit—the
language that explains the effect of clicking as agreement to terms
must be made explicit.
Traditionally, the recipient of documents is not bound by terms
of which they are unaware, such as an arbitration clause printed on the
back of a confirmation order.40 As one New York State Appellate
Division Court noted, “a party should not be bound by clauses printed
on the reverse side of a document unless it is established that such
matters were properly called to its attention and that it assented to the
provisions there stated . . . .”41 A mere opportunity to review the terms
was typically insufficient to bind the recipient of a paper form to terms
that are not called to the recipient’s attention. For example, in a case
38

817 F.3d 1029, 1034–35 (7th Cir. 2016).
E.g., Kauders v. Uber Techs., Inc., 159 N.E.3d 1033, 1049 (Mass. 2021);
Emmanuel v. Handy Techs., Inc., 992 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2021).
40
See Windsor Mills, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 994 (determining “no agreement by plaintiff
to arbitrate, regardless of its outward manifestations of apparent assent as exhibited by
its retention of the forms without objection and its initial acceptance of the yarn”
where the plaintiff did not have actual knowledge of the provision).
41
Arthur Philip Exp. Corp. v. Leathertone, Inc., 275 A.D. 102, 105 (N.Y. App. Div.
1949).
39
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involving a bank’s service fees, a California State Appellate Court
wrote:
[Although] there can be no argument here that purchasers
have been given an adequate opportunity to become aware
of and consent to the service charge provision in the subject
money orders . . . the provision in question is effectively hidden from the view of money order purchasers until after the
transactions are completed. In addition, given the size of the
print with which the service charge provision is set forth in
the money order and the fact that the Bank’s agents do not
as a rule call the provision to the customer’s attention, it
would be reasonable to presume that most customers never,
in fact, become aware of the provision’s existence. Under
these circumstances, it must be concluded that the Bank’s
money order purchasers are not chargeable with either actual or constructive notice of the service charge provision,
and therefore cannot be deemed to have consented to the
provision as part of their transaction with the Bank.42
To the contrary is the notice and manifestation standard which
requires accepting two different legal fictions. The first is that a certain
action—i.e., clicking on an “accept” button—constitutes a
“manifestation of consent.” Unlike with paper adhesive form
contracts, consumers cannot sign adhesive electronic form contracts.
Courts, however, determined that these digital clickwraps were just like
paper contracts even if the manifestation of assent was different.43 A
click on an “accept” button was sufficient for that purpose.44 Thus, the
“manifestation of consent” is a legal fiction because it constructs
meaning from an act which may have been done reflexively or
42

Cory v. Golden State Bank, 95 Cal. App. 3d 360, 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E. 2d 113, 121 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (stating that
hyperlinks “should be treated the same as a multipage written paper contract. The
blue hyperlink simply takes a person to another page of the contract, similar to turning
the page of a written paper contract.”); Scherillo v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 684 F.
Supp. 2d 313, at 322 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (concluding that a person who “checks the box
agreeing to the terms and conditions of a purchase on an internet site without scrolling
down to read all of the terms and conditions is in the same position as a person who
turns to the last page of a paper contract and signs it without reading the terms––
namely, the clause is still valid.”).
44
Scherillo, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 321–22; see also Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp.
2d 829, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[C]licking [a] hyperlinked phrase is the twenty-first
century equivalent of turning over the cruise ticket. In both cases, the consumer is
prompted to examine terms of sale that are located somewhere else.”); Meyer v. Uber
Techs., 868 F.3d 66, 79 (2d Cir. 2017) (finding notice and manifestation of assent
despite assent not being express).
43
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unintentionally. Even if people do not read their contracts, they are
aware that they are signing them. By contrast, people are habituated
to click “accept” online automatically without being aware that they are
entering into a legally binding agreement.
The second fiction requires more of a leap of imagination because
it finds notice is reasonable even if most people would not notice it. In other
words, the notice and manifestation standard conflates two fictions—the
fiction that most people would read or even notice online adhesive
terms when, in fact, most people do not, and the fiction that most
people would view a website visitor’s clicking on an icon as an intent to
enter into a contract rather than simply a desire to proceed with online
activity. The consequence is that constructive notice has morphed into
constructive assent. Courts have held that the act of clicking on an
“accept” icon both manifests assent and is evidence of reasonable
notice, even if the adherent neither intended to accept nor saw the
notice.45
Some courts reason that the adherent had inquiry notice or a duty
to read if there was reasonable (i.e., constructive) notice of legal
terms.46 But this is a misapplication of the doctrine. The duty to read
should apply only after it has already been determined that the offeree
has clearly manifested assent to legal terms.47 The duty to read then
determines whether the offeree is bound to all the terms in the
45
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837–40 (finding plaintiff assented by clicking even
though plaintiff did not have actual notice and was not presented with the terms); cf.
Starke v. Square Trade, 913 F.3d 279, 295 (2d Cir. 2019) (noting that offeree “had a
duty to read the terms of the contract presented to him” but that “the duty-to-read
principle still require that the offeree be put on notice of the existence of additional
contract terms before it can be said that he has assented to them” and that “the duty
to read does not morph into a duty to ferret out contract provisions when they are
contained in inconspicuous hyperlinks”).
46
Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74 (“Where there is no evidence that the offeree had actual
notice of the terms of the agreement, the offeree will still be bound by the agreement
if a reasonably prudent user would be on inquiry notice of the terms”); Thorne v.
Square, No. 20CV5119NGGTAM, 2022 WL 542383, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2022)
(finding that a “reasonable smartphone user would be on inquiry notice as to the Cash
App General Terms of Service and arbitration provision therein” because the
hyperlink to the General Terms was clear and conspicuous).
47
In re Pacific Northwest Storage LLC v. Fields, 386 B.R. 764, 774 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 2007) (“Parties have a duty to read a document they sign”); Edmundson v. City
of Bridgeport Bd. of Educ., No. CV196083811S, 2019 WL 5066951, at *3 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Sept. 18, 2019) (“The general rule is that where a person signs or accepts a formal
written contract affecting his pecuniary interests, it is that person’s duty to read it and
notice of its contents will be imputed to that person if that person negligently fails to
do so.”).
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contract. A website visitor should not have a duty to read everything
that a company puts on its website. In other words, the duty to read
does not, and should not, apply to the question of contract formation; it should
only apply to determine which terms are enforceable. With online notices,
the primary question is whether the offeree manifested assent and
applying the duty to read at this stage would circumvent this inquiry.
The conflation of “reasonable notice” and “manifestation of
consent” essentially ignores the important differences between notices
and contracts. Constructive assent can waive rights and incur
obligations.
Accordingly, under the notice and manifestation
standard, the consumer does not have to actually see the notice as long
as the notice is objectively “reasonable” or “conspicuous.” Because
notices are treated as contracts under this standard, they trigger the
“duty to read,” which presumes that one has read the document that
one has signed. Online notices, however, do not elicit signatures.
Instead, the user clicks, which is an action that the user undertakes
automatically and habitually multiple times on a variety of websites.
Applying the duty to read to the standard of reasonable notice
poses a heavy and unrealistic burden with adhesive online terms.
While it may be reasonable to presume that someone who signs a
contract has read the terms, the same cannot be said where someone
clicks on a mouse. In addition to being unrealistic, it is socially
undesirable for consumers to actually read the voluminous terms that
they encounter every day, as it would impede their ability to be
productive and contribute to society in useful ways. One study
estimated that it would take the average adult approximately twentynine to thirty-two minutes to read a website privacy policy and another
fifteen to seventeen minutes to read a website’s terms of service.48
Multiply that by the number of websites consumers encounter on a
daily basis and the inefficiency of terms and their societal cost becomes
clear. Not surprisingly, most users do not read terms of service.49
The combination of reasonable notice and a duty to read seems to be
borrowed from torts, and particularly, products liability.50 Generally, a

48

Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet: Ignoring
the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services, 23 INFO.,
COMMC’N & SOC’Y 1, 128, 128–33 (2020).
49
Id. (finding that 98 percent of 543 study participants did not read digital
adhesive terms).
50
See Curtis E.A. Karnow, The Internet and Contract Formation, 18 BERKELEY BUS. L.J.
135, 153 (2021) (stating that the rationale for the reasonable notice standard of online
contract formation is that “users and consumers are at ‘fault’ if they do not review the
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product is considered defective if foreseeable risks of harm could be
reduced or avoided with reasonable warnings.51 The adequacy of a
notice depends upon its “reasonableness in the circumstances,”52 and
warnings must be “adequate to alert a reasonably prudent person” of
the harm.53 Moreover, a reasonably prudent person is expected to
read a reasonable warning. The Restatement (Second) of Torts §
402A, cmt. j states: “Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably
assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a
warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective
condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.”54 Many courts also adopt
the reciprocal presumption that the buyer/plaintiff would have
heeded the warning if one had been given, which benefits the buyer
/plaintiff.55
The transfer of a tort standard to contract is inappropriate given
the different legal effect of a notice and a contract. A finding of
reasonable notice in tort is a shield for the drafter. By contrast, a
finding of reasonable notice in contract can be both a shield and a
sword for the drafter.
Furthermore, the determination of
reasonableness in tort for purposes of warnings is typically a question

terms which are accessible to them” and that this “ascription of fault” is a “brand of
negligence . . . measured by a reasonable person standard.”).
51
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 1965);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 (c) (AM. L. INST. 1997).
52
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. i. (AM. L. INST. 1997).
53
Serna v. Roche Lab’ys, Div. of Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 684 P.2d 1187, 1189
(N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (stating five criteria to determine the adequacy of drug
warnings); Purdy v. Deere & Co., 492 P.3d 99, 112 (Or. Ct. App. 2021) (noting that
warnings must be in a form that catches the attention of a “reasonably prudent
person”).
54
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 1965).
55
Benjamin J. Jones, Annotation, Presumption or Inference, in Products Liability Action
Based on Failure to Warn, That User Would Have Heeded an Adequate Warning Had One Been
Given, 38 A.L.R. 5th 683, 701–05 (2002).
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of fact for the jury.56 By contrast, courts typically assess reasonable
notice for purposes of determining online contract formation.57
Courts should not, however, decide the issue of reasonable notice
because it is a fact-based inquiry that is within the everyday experience
of consumers. Unfortunately, the result of judges making factual
determinations better left to juries is that some courts have concluded
that a reasonably prudent offeree should respond to adhesive digital terms
in a way that no reasonable consumer does or should be expected to
behave.58
B. The Role of Consent in Contract Law
Consent is an amorphous concept, which means different things
in different contexts. Generally, a person must communicate consent
voluntarily and with an understanding of what the consented-to act
entails.59 The issue of consent to adhesive terms is a contentious and
complicated one. Adhesive terms could be contracts, but they do not
need to be and often are not. Physical notices (e.g., signs) typically
communicate the consent of the drafter, not the adherent. No one has
the right to enter onto the property of another without the owner’s
consent.60 A notice may grant permission or a license. For example, a
notice may permit the licensee’s use of the licensor’s tangible or
intangible property (e.g., YOU MAY MAKE TWO COPIES OF THE
SOFTWARE; YOU MAY SMOKE IN THIS AREA; YOU MAY HELP
YOURSELF TO THE CANDY IN THE DISH). The consent of the
licensee is not required for the license because the licensee has no rights
to the property and no obligation to use the property. But a license
56

Kaiser v. Johnson & Johnson, 947 F.3d 996, 1015 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[W]hether a
warning is ‘reasonable’ is ‘generally a question of fact for the trier of fact to resolve ….
It only becomes a ‘question of law when the facts are undisputed and only a single
inference can be drawn from those facts.’”) (quoting Cook v. Ford Motor Co., 913
N.E.2d 311, 319, 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)); Eghnayem v. Boston Sci. Corp., 873 F.3d
1304, 1321 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding under Florida law, “the adequacy of warnings . . .
is a question of fact” but “can become a question of law where the warning is accurate,
clear, and unambiguous”) (quoting Felix v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 540 So. 2d 102,
105 (Fla. 1989)).
57
Specht v. Netscape Commc’n Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that
court could find reasonable notice and objective manifestation of assent “as a matter
of law on the record before it”).
58
See Obar, supra note 48.
59
See NANCY KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 9–10 (Cambridge U.
Press 2019) (discussing various conceptions of consent).
60
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §58, at 393 (W. Publ’n
Co. 5th ed. 1984).
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agreement requires consent because it expresses a bargain where the
licensee is also giving up something in exchange for the right to use
the property.
A notice might express the drafter’s consent, but it might also
express clear non-consent. For example, the drafter might state clearly
in the notice, KEEP OFF—PRIVATE PROPERTY, which indicates that
the property owner/drafter is expressly not consenting to public uses
of the property. In some cases, however, a notice may express
conditions to the drafter’s consent, and whether those conditions
require the adherent’s consent depends on what happens if the
adherent does not comply with those conditions.
Adhesive terms imposed upon another party without consent are
not a contract. For example, a sign that states that property owner P
may eject all smokers from its premises may be enforced without visitor
V’s consent; V has no right to be on P’s premises, so ejecting V does not
diminish V’s rights. A sign that states that property owner P may collect
a fee of five dollars from visitors requires V’s consent, meaning that V
must have knowledge of the requirement, voluntarily entered onto P’s
premises, and intended to accept by doing so.
Although a prerequisite to a contract, consent alone is inadequate
to find assent; the parties must also intend to be bound by their
actions.61 The objective standard is used to determine assent for
practical reasons—it would be too difficult to hold anyone to a contract
if they could later claim they never subjectively intended to be bound
despite clear language in a written document stating otherwise. In
some cases, the actions of the parties clearly manifest intent despite the
absence of express words. In other cases, however, the actions may be
ambiguous. In those cases, courts turn to the doctrine of implied-in61
E.g., Copano Energy, LLC v. Bujnoch, 593 S.W.3d 721, 730 (Tex. 2020)
(citations omitted) (“[A] fundamentally ‘essential element of the contract,’ without
which no contract can exist, is the parties’ intent to be legally bound to the contract’s
terms.” (quoting FPL Energy, LLC v. TXU Portfolio Mgmt. Co., 426 S.W.3d 59, 63
(Tex. 2014))); Karns v. Jalapeno Tree Holdings, LLC, 459 S.W.3d 683, 692 (Tex. App.
2015) (“Parties form a binding contract when the following elements are present: (i)
an offer; (ii) an acceptance in strict compliance with the terms of the offer; (iii) a
meeting of the minds; (iv) each party’s consent to the terms; and (v) execution and
delivery of the contract with the intent that it be mutual and binding.” (quoting
Cavalry Invs., L.L.C. v. Sunstar Acceptance Corp., No. 05-00-00508-CV, 2001 WL
371545, at *3 (Tex. App. Apr. 16, 2001))). Contra RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS.
§ 21 (AM. L. INST. 1979) (“Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally
binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but a manifestation of intention
that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a
contract.”).
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law contract which does not involve a contract at all but, to avoid
injustice, allows enforcement of terms that were never mutually agreed
upon.62
Online contracting differs from physical world, paper-based
contracting. The ubiquity and ease of digital mass contracting places
onerous cognitive burdens on the adherent who may simply be
browsing a website and not expecting to be thrust into a legal situation.
The diluted version of consent may have unexpected consequences
given that contractual consent often suffices to fulfill consent in other
contexts. Many federal and state consumer protection and antidiscrimination laws adopt a disclosure and consent regime.
Unfortunately, they often omit or leave vague what constitutes
“consent.” A statute permitting electronic communications may not
distinguish the ways that electronic forms affect the consumer’s
consent and intentionality.63 A Docusign document which looks like a
scanned copy of a printed standard form agreement and requires
multiple clicks to manifest assent to specific provisions is perceived
differently by the adherent than a single click to terms of service which
the adherent never actually sees.
III. DIFFERENT TYPES OF ADHESIVE TERMS
A. Digital Adhesive Terms Are Not (Usually) Contracts
All consumer transactions are marked by a lack of bargaining
power. Consumer contracts are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis
which typically leaves consumers with little choice but to accept the
company’s terms. Adhesive form contracts abound today, and the
power imbalances and consent-related issues associated with them,
plague both paper and digital forms. But digitization shapes and
affects the ways adhesive terms are used (and abused) by businesses
and how they are perceived (or ignored) by adherents.

62
Karen Stavins Enter., Inc. v. Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, 36 N.E.3d 1015, 1018 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2015) (“A contract implied in law is one in which no actual agreement exists
between the parties, but a duty to pay a reasonable value is imposed upon the recipient
of services or goods to prevent an unjust enrichment.”); see Slick v. Reinecker, 839 A.2d
784, 788 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (“[W]hat is confusingly called a contract implied
in law is actually no contract at all.”).
63
E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b)(2)(b)(ii)–(3)(B)(i) (permitting credit reporting
agency to furnish consumer report for employment purposes for a consumer applying
for employment by computer if the consumer consents “orally, in writing, or
electronically to the procurement of the report by that person”).
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Businesses took advantage of the digital form and, consequently,
of their users who they knew would not—and could not—read the
presented terms, which were voluminous and frequently updated. The
early internet contracts were in the form of “clickwraps” where the user
clicks the “agree” button, and “scrollwraps” which are a type of
clickwrap where the user scrolls to the bottom of the contract before
clicking “agree.”64 When digital contracts were presented as clickwraps
or scrollwraps, which they initially were, users understood that they
were entering into a contract by clicking the “agree” button. Courts
generally found clickwraps and scrollwraps enforceable.65 The digital
form did not make much difference in terms of user perception or
substance. Businesses did not impose dozens of pages of terms because
the user would resent having to scroll or click through dozens of pages.
But courts typically found browsewraps were insufficient as contracting
forms because the user did not manifest consent.66
Businesses soon developed a new contracting form, referred to as
a hybridwrap or a “sign-in wrap” which combines the hyperlink
characteristic of browsewraps with the click button that characterizes
clickwraps.67 But the hybridwrap form also fails on both counts, and
one federal court has referred to it as a “questionable form of internet
contracting.”68 It is ineffective as a notice, just as a browsewrap is,
because the relevant information is not contained in the notice. The
notice provides no information other than that legal terms are available
if the user takes further action. The user then has the burden of
seeking out terms behind links. Unlike tangible notices which convey
important information, browsewraps and hybridwraps do not
necessarily signal whether the hidden information is important or
trivial. 69
64
Berkson v. Gogo, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 394–95 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (referring to
“clickwraps” as agreements where a user affirmatively clicks to acknowledge
agreements and “scrollwraps” as one where the user “must scroll through an internet
agreement and click on a separate ‘I agree’ button in order to assent to the terms and
conditions of the host website”).
65
See Sarchi v. Uber Techs., Inc., 268 A.3d 258, 266–67 (Me. 2022).
66
Id. at 397.
67
Id. at 399.
68
Id. But see Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 841 (enforcing sign-in wrap).
69
See Sarchi, 268 A.3d at 268 (finding that the enforceability of scrollwraps depends
“almost entirely” on “the features of the interfaces on which they appear” and
concluding that Uber’s registration process for riders did not provide reasonable
notice of the content of the terms and conditions). Id. at 269; Sellers v. Just Answer,
LLC, 289 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 20–25 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (noting that generally scrollwrap
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The notice and manifestation of consent standard erroneously
combines contract law’s duty to read and tort law’s assumption of the
risk. X assumes the risk if X is fully apprised of the potential dangers
of an activity and chooses to proceed. Assumption of the risk may be
express or implied.70 Express assumption of the risk often involves a
signed waiver by the party assuming the risk.71 Implied assumption of
the risk involves conduct.72 But as previously discussed, the duty to
read should not apply to notices because it is the drafter who must
make the notice conspicuous.
The duty to read applies to contracts, and to apply them to online
terms presumes what has yet to be proven. In other words, the duty to
read a browsewrap or a hybridwrap presumes that a hyperlink is a
contract and that notice of the hyperlink is enough to prompt a duty
to read. But to make such a presumption where someone has not
manifested an intent to enter into a contract reverses the order in
which contracts are typically entered. A party must manifest intent to
enter into a contract before a duty to read is imposed. In the tangible
contract world, a party manifests intent to enter into a contract by
signing it. Online, however, courts have confused this order and have
presumed a contract by substituting constructive notice with actual
notice.73 Moreover, this constructive notice does not indicate what
those terms say, only that they exist somewhere.
and clickwrap agreements are enforceable, browsewraps unenforceable and sign-in
wraps to be in the middle depending upon the website design).
70
Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime, 508 S.E.2d 565,
569 (1998) (noting that “many courts distinguish between ‘express’ assumption of the
risk and ‘implied’ assumption of the risk); JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL.,UNDERSTANDING
TORTS 226 (6th ed. 2018) (“Assumption of the risk is generally divided into two types:
express and implied.”).
71
Davenport, 508 S.E.2d at 569–70 (“Express assumption of the risk applies when
the parties expressly agree in advance, either in writing or orally, that the plaintiff will
relieve the defendant of his or her legal duty toward the plaintiff.”); DIAMOND et. al.,
supra note 73, at 226 (“Express assumption of the risk exists when, by contract or
otherwise, a plaintiff explicitly agrees to accept a risk.”).
72
Davenport, 508 S.E.2d at 570–571 (noting that “implied assumption of the
risk…arises when the plaintiff implicitly, rather than expressly, assumes known risks”);
DIAMOND et. al., supra note 73, at 227 (“Implied assumption of the risk is…implied by
the plaintiff’s conduct in relation to the risk.”).
73
See, e.g., Meyer v. Uber Tecs, Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 2017) (“When there
is no evidence that the offeree had actual notice of the agreement, the offeree will still
be bound by the agreement if a reasonably prudent offeree would be on inquiry notice
of the terms”…only if the undisputed facts establish ‘reasonably conspicuous notice of
the existence of contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those
terms’will we find that a contract has been formed.”). The court determined that
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The purpose of a notice differs from the purpose of a contract.
The purpose of a notice is to inform the viewer. If the notice is
inconspicuous or overly complex, it will not have served its function.
Accordingly, the notice must be effective in the way that it
communicates its message. A notice may also be subject to regulation,
meaning that there may be certain requirements that must be met in
order for it to be effective.74
A notice provides permission or fair warning to others. For
example, a sign may inform visitors that they are on private property.
The sign may welcome them, or it may notify them that they are
trespassing. For the sign to be effective as notice, it must be
conspicuous and comprehensible.75
The validity of a notice that serves as a warning is often regulated
by statute.76 If there is no regulation governing the requirements of
effective notice, the courts will determine whether notice was
conspicuous.77 Conspicuousness refers to whether it was obvious and
noticeable given the context and surroundings. Even assuming that a
court finds that a notice is sufficiently conspicuous or that it is in
conformance with regulation, the authority of the drafter extends only
as far as the drafter’s property rights. Because the drafter’s authority
to post and enforce the notice derives from its property ownership, the
consent of the adherent is not required for the notice to be effective.
Another function of a notice is that it may protect the drafter from
liability by establishing that a property owner was not negligent or that
a visitor assumes the risk. Tort law requires property owners to provide
notice of hidden dangers.78 If X enters onto Y’s property and there is
a conspicuous notice warning of falling rock, X’s continuing onto the
property is understood to mean that X has assumed the risk of being
hit by falling rock. The condition (falling rock) is not one that Y can
remedy and so Y does what Y can do to mitigate potential harm by
posting the notice. It makes no difference whether X actually saw the
although Meyer was not on actual notice, he had “reasonably conspicuous notice”).
Id. at 79; see also Fteja v. Facebook, 841 F.Supp. 2d 829 (2012) (although plaintiff did
not remember agreeing to agreement, court found that contract was formed because
a reasonably prudent offeree would have noticed the link).
74
See discussion of notices infra Part II.B.1.
75
See e.g., 11 C.J.S. Bridges § 143 (2022) (“A warning sign which is obscured by
vegetation and almost illegible affords no notice to the traveler and no defense to the
bridge proprietor.”).
76
See infra Part III.B.1.
77
See infra Part III.B.1.
78
See infra Part III.B.1.
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notice; what matters is that the notice was objectively conspicuous. The
duty is one that belongs to Y—not X—and so it is Y’s posting an
adequate notice and care of the premises that is relevant.
Thus, a notice warning of dangerous conditions must be
conspicuous in order to be effective; however, it does not require
consent. X’s willingness to accept the warning is irrelevant because X
must accept the terms that Y establishes, as it is Y’s property and Y is
granting permission to X to enter upon it gratis (i.e., X’s entry is not
part of a bargained-for exchange). Because Y’s authority to post the
notice derives from property law, and tort law determines the notice’s
effect, the notice may be unilaterally imposed by Y and does not
require consent.
A notice is first and foremost information. Notices are typically
used to provide warnings and to alert the recipient to potential danger.
They play an important risk-allocation role in society. They may be
used to limit the liability of the drafter, or to take away an argument or
defense that the notice-recipient might otherwise have. But the notice
does not have the power to serve a particular function simply because
the drafter intends it to serve that function. The drafter may not use
the notice to exercise authority that it does not have.
The authority of the drafter depends upon its underlying
property rights. A proprietor may grant permissions to use the
property, but it cannot deny or take away rights of others except under
two circumstances: the other party consents, or the law expressly
permits it. A notice imposes its terms without regard to the recipient’s
consent, but those terms are not necessarily effective or enforceable.
Notices—unlike contracts—are regulated and limited in scope. Their
enforceability depends upon their drafter’s underlying property rights
and entitlements. By contrast, the authority of a contract requires the
consent of the parties to it because a contract does more than simply
establish boundaries regarding existing rights; it reallocates them. In
the absence of consent, the reallocation would amount to coercion or
theft.
Constructive notice is two steps removed from a contract. It is not
part of a bargained-for exchange, but it is also not an actual notice. A
constructive or quasi-contract (i.e., one that is implied-in-law) is not,
and should, not be enforceable according to its terms because the
terms have not been agreed to by the adherent. Rather, the contract
is enforceable to the extent equity requires. Given that a constructive
contract is not enforceable as a bargain, it makes no sense for a
constructive notice to be enforced as one. To the contrary, it also
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should be recognized only to the extent it is fair and reasonable, as
justice requires.
The form in which adhesive terms are presented has a different
purpose and effect depending upon whether a notice or a contract is
implicated. The form is a starting point for contracts; it determines
whether the adhesive terms should be understood as contractual.
Whether the contract looks like a contract is also relevant in assessing
procedural unconscionability. Contractual form alone, however, is
insufficient to make a contract. A contract requires assent, which is
determined by assessing whether the offeree’s conduct can be
reasonably understood to mean assent.79 Thus, if the adhesive terms
look like a contract to a reasonable offeree, the offeree’s conduct
determines whether there is acceptance. On the other hand, if the
presentation of adhesive terms is not contractual in form because they
dictate terms and do not seek the other party’s signature80 (i.e., they
look like a notice), the drafter must communicate that the adhesive
terms are nonetheless binding; the drafter’s conduct (i.e., effort to
present the notice in a conspicuous manner so that it reasonably
communicates its binding nature) should be the focal point of inquiry
regarding enforceability. In other words, if the adhesive terms are
presented in a manner that is not obviously contractual in form, they
should not be contracts, but they may be effective as a notice, license,
or under a quasi-contract theory.
B. A Taxonomy of Adhesive Terms
This Section proposes a taxonomy (Figure 1) that recognizes the
varieties of adhesive terms. A taxonomy of adhesive terms provides
guidance regarding how to assess the enforceability of terms in a given
context. As this Article has explained, the conflation of adhesive terms
with adhesive contracts undermines the predictability of doctrinal
rules and perpetuates power imbalances. A taxonomy of adhesive
terms may be helpful in correcting doctrinal transgressions that
enforce oppressive terms and sanction abusive contracting practices.

79

See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
See Roseanna Sommers, Contract Schemas, 17 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 293, 295–96
(2021), https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-040721-103558 (reviewing studies
on contracts and finding that “[s]everal studies have confirmed that signatures loom
large in the lay conception of contracts” leading to the conclusion that people are
inclined to perceive a contract as containing a signature block and requiring a
signature at the bottom of the document); id. at 295.
80
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Figure 1: Taxonomy of Adhesive Terms

A taxonomy does not invalidate or ban the use of adhesive terms.
On the contrary, a taxonomy may save them by leading to a better
understanding of the socially useful role that adhesive terms can play
in a fair and well-functioning marketplace. Some adhesive terms may
be non-contractual, in which case their enforceability hinges upon
their scope and the property rights of the drafter. Other adhesive
terms may be contractual, but their enforceability depends upon
consent.
The proposed taxonomy provides guidance regarding the legal
effect of adhesive terms. Courts too often fail to distinguish adhesive
terms and often conflate contracts and notices, express contracts with
implied contracts, and unilateral (or reverse unilateral) implied
contracts with bilateral express contracts. The result has been a lack
of consistency and predictability in case law, especially the developing
common law governing digital adhesive terms such as terms of service.
Courts should not use standards derived from tort and property
law to enforce notices as contracts. For example, some courts will
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erroneously discuss the adherent’s duty to read as though it were
actually a duty, rather than a presumption. They also refer to tort
standards, claiming that reasonable notice would prompt a prudent or
reasonable offeree to inquire about the terms. The misapplication of
tort standards is especially glaring with digital adhesive terms where
courts have applied the standard of a “reasonably prudent computer
or smartphone user”81 in assessing contract formation. But there is no
legal compulsion to read terms, and a failure to do so is not a breach
of any duty which subjects one to liability. It should be the signature
on the page (the “manifestation of consent”) which opens a party up
to contract liability. In the absence of a promise, adhesive terms are
not contractual; nevertheless, they may be enforceable depending
upon what they state and the context in which they are presented.
They might, for example, convey a license which doesn’t require the
adherent’s consent. They may limit the drafter’s liability if they meet
certain disclosure or conspicuousness requirements. They may reflect
societal norms and expectations and may be enforceable under a
quasi-contractual theory. The rest of this Section explains each type of
adhesive term in greater detail.
1. Notices
A notice serves several functions. It may communicate interesting
information, such as indicating that property has been placed on the
national register of historic places or that a historic figure once lived
in it. It may establish norms: Please wear a mask when entering store. Please
lower your voice in library. It may also warn: Caution: Beware of Dog.
A notice may shift legal burdens and presumptions. A notice
stating that a house has significant historical value has the function of
providing interesting information, but it serves no legal purpose. It
simply educates the notice-recipient. A notice that warns, however, has
legal effects under both tort and criminal law and may shift
presumptions and burdens, making it easier or harder to establish
liability. For example, a landowner may be liable for failing to warn
visitors of dangerous conditions on the property.
A notice that warns also serves a due process function so that the
notice-recipient is not later able to claim ignorance of the violation.
For example, a sign that states, “Private Property—Keep Off.
Trespassers Will be Prosecuted,” will undermine the notice-recipient’s
argument that the notice-recipient believed the property was a public
81
HomeAdvisor, Inc. v. Waddell, No. 05-19-00669-CV, 2020 WL 2988565, at *4
(Tex. App. June 4, 2020).
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park. For example, under New York law, a person is guilty of criminal
trespass when that person “knowingly enters” a building that is used as
a public housing project “in violation of conspicuously posted rules or
regulations governing entry.”82 The notice (in this case, the
“conspicuously posted rules or regulations”) responds to the
requirements of the statute and creates the frame through which the
notice-recipient’s subsequent behavior can be characterized. A lack of
notice (meaning no “conspicuously posted rules or regulations”)
means that the person could not have “knowingly” entered the
building.83
Notices play an important risk allocative role in tort law which may
have significant legal effects. A notice may limit the liability of the
drafter in a products liability case by showing that the drafter was not
negligent and included adequate warning or instruction, or that the
notice-recipient assumed the risk of injury.84 Section 402A of the
Second Restatement of Torts states that directions or warnings may
“prevent” a product from being found “unreasonably dangerous.”85
Furthermore, it states: “Where a warning is given, the seller may
reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product
bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in
defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.”86

82

N.Y. PENAL CODE § 140.10 (McKinney 2012). Contra RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, §§158, 164 (AM. L. INST. 1965) (stating a trespasser under tort law must only
intend to enter onto land).
83
People v. Mackay, 16 Misc. 3d 398, 400 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2007) (“Without any
evidence of conspicuously posted no trespassing signs the essential element of
knowledge that one’s presence is unlawful cannot be imputed to a defendant so as to
find him guilty of trespass.”).
84
See Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, 303 Md. 581, n. 12 (1985) (“If a product
otherwise unreasonably dangerous can be made safe for reasonably foreseeable uses
by adequate warnings or instructions, liability will be avoided, and the focus in such
cases is generally upon the adequacy of notice. If the warnings or instructions are
adequate the product is not defective, and the plaintiff cannot recover under a theory
of strict liability in tort. The cause of the injury in such cases is the failure to read or
follow the adequate warnings or instructions, and not a defective product. One who
reads the warning and then proceeds voluntarily and unreasonably to encounter the
danger thereby made known to him will assume the risk of that danger.”).
85
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402A cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 1965).
86
Id. See also Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 72 Md. App. 199, 207 (1987)
(finding that gasoline can that had warnings on two of the four sides was adequate and
that product was not in defective condition and was not unreasonably dangerous).
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In some jurisdictions, a defense to liability includes showing the
injured party assumed the risk of injury.87 A notice may also help prove
the plaintiff was contributorily or comparatively negligent88 or that the
defendant exercised or did not exercise reasonable care.89 It is the role
of the courts—and not the drafter—to determine the legal purpose
and effectiveness of the notice. While the drafter controls the notice,
it does not control its power or determine its effectiveness.
The form of a notice is often regulated by statute or regulation.90
The form requirements may include physical characteristics and
wording. For example, in Florida, the definition of trespass requires
that the property be “legally posted,” which is defined both in terms of
physical requirements (such as placement of signage and height of
letters) as well as the actual language or wording that must be
employed:
(5)(a) ”Posted land” is that land upon which:
1. Signs are placed not more than 500 feet apart along, and
at each corner of, the boundaries of the land, upon which
signs there appears prominently, in letters of not less than
[two] inches in height, the words “no trespassing” and in addition thereto the name of the owner, lessee, or occupant of
said land. Said signs shall be placed along the boundary line
of posted land in a manner and in such position as to be
clearly noticeable from outside the boundary line; or
2.a. Conspicuous no trespassing notice is painted on trees
or posts on the property, provided that the notice is:
87

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402A; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS
§25 (“If the plaintiff has been contributorily negligent in failing to take reasonable
precautions, the plaintiff’s recovery in a strict-liability claim . . . is reduced in
accordance with the share of comparative responsibility assigned to the plaintiff.”).
88
E.g., 65 N.Y. Jur.2d Highways, Streets and Bridges §548 (stating a traveler who has
knowledge or notice of dangerous condition but voluntarily and unnecessarily
proceeds “may be guilty of contributory negligence or may be held to have assumed
the risk”); 11 C.J.S. Bridges §143 (“Absence of warning of the defective character of a
bridge may be considered in determining whether or not a traveler exercised due
care.”).
89
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS § 18 (a) (“A defendant whose conduct creates a
risk of physical or emotional harm can fail to exercise reasonable care by failing to
warn of the danger if (1) the defendant knows or has reason to know: (a) of that risk;
and (b) that those encountering the risk will be unaware of it; and (2) a warning might
be effective in reducing the risk of harm.”).
90
See CAL. PENAL CODE §602.8(a) (West 2004) (stating that entering upon land
without the written permission of the landowner where “signs forbidding trespass are
displayed at intervals not less than three to the mile along all exterior boundaries and
all roads and trails entering the lands” is a “public offense”).
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(I) Painted in an international orange color and displaying the stenciled words “No Trespassing” in letters
no less than [two] inches high and [one] inch wide either vertically or horizontally;
(II) Placed so that the bottom of the painted notice is
not less than [three] feet from the ground or more than
[five] feet from the ground; and
(III) Placed at locations that are readily visible to any
person approaching the property and no more than 500
feet apart on agricultural land.
2.b. Beginning October 1, 2007, when a landowner uses the
painted no trespassing posting to identify a “no trespassing”
area, those painted notices shall be accompanied by signs
complying with subparagraph 1. and placed conspicuously at
all places where entry to the property is normally expected
or known to occur.91
The punishment for the type of trespass may depend, at least in
part, upon the type of notice that was given. For example, in Florida,
trespass is generally a misdemeanor;92 however, it is a felony if a notice
was at a construction site which was “legally posted” and stated in
“substantially the following manner”: THIS AREA IS A DESIGNATED
CONSTRUCTION SITE, AND ANYONE WHO TRESPASSES ON
THIS PROPERTY COMMITS A FELONY.93 If the construction site
notice does not identify the property as a construction site, a trespass
would not be categorized as a felony.
The form of a notice is generally subject to strict rules and explicit
requirements along with the more general standard that the notice be
“conspicuous.” Under the Florida statute, for example, a sign must
adhere to the express requirements (placed 500 feet or less on the
boundaries of the land, in letters at least two inches in height, painted
in “international orange”) or may be subject to a defense by the noticerecipient that the notice was ineffective—and so fails in its purpose to
characterize the notice-recipient’s conduct as trespassing. As one

91

FLA. STAT. § 810.011(5)(a) (effective May 18, 2020).
Id. § 810.09(2)(a) (effective Oct.1, 2018). There are exceptions for aggravating
circumstances, such as if the offender committed destructive or harmful acts. Id.
93
Id. § 810.09(2)(d)1 (effective Oct.1, 2018). If the property is less than an acre,
it must have letters “not less than [two] inches in height” with the same language and
placed at a specific location. Id. §810.09(2)(d)2.
92
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court noted, constructive notice under the statute requires “[s]trict
compliance with the statutory requirements.”94
In D.T. v. State, a Florida appellate court found that the appellant
was not guilty of trespass because there was a lack of notice.95 Under
the relevant statute, notice could be given either by “actual
communication” to the offender or by “posting” the property.96 The
court noted that the requirements for posting were “very specific,
requiring signs placed at specific locations, at specific heights, and in
type of a certain size.”97 The court determined that because the
property was not posted as required by statute, the officer had no
probable cause to arrest the appellant for trespassing.98
Conspicuousness allows for context so that a statute may require both
strict compliance with certain provisions and conspicuousness. The Florida
statute, for example, states that posted land must have a “conspicuous no
trespassing notice” but does not state that meeting the requirements
(specified wording, height, etc.) alone will always be deemed conspicuous.
Furthermore, the signs must be placed “conspicuously” at places of property
entry.

The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) provides another
example of a requirement of conspicuousness along with explicit form
requirements. U.C.C. §2-316 allows sellers to exclude or modify a
warranty of merchantability as long as the exclusion or modification
expressly mentions “merchantability” and, if in writing, the writing
must be “conspicuous.”99
The power of a notice depends upon its adherence to the
requirements of form. For example, a notice that states “This is Private
Property. Stay Off. Trespassers Will Be Prosecuted,” informs those
who might not realize the property is private. The warning is not
merely educative but characterizes the viewer’s subsequent conduct.
For example, Florida defines trespass on property as:

94

C.B.S. v. State, 184 So. 3d 611, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). The court further
noted that the “case law is rife with examples of courts requiring strict compliance with
section 810.011(5)(a)1.” Id. (citations omitted).
95
D.T. v. State, 87 So. 3d 1235, 1242–43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing
conviction for resisting arrest because officer had no reasonable suspicion of trespass
as lot was not “posted” within the meaning of the trespass statutes).
96
Id. at 1239 (citing FLA. STAT. § 810.09(1)(a)1 (effective Oct.1, 2018)).
97
Id. at 1239 (citing FLA. STAT. § 810.011(5) (effective May 18, 2020)).
98
Id. at 1240.
99
U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977).
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(1)(a) A person who, without being authorized, licensed, or
invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property
other than a structure of conveyance:
1. As to which notice against entering or remaining is
given, either by actual communication to the offender
or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s.
810.011.100
Similarly, under California law, trespass requires “willfully”
entering onto land “where signs forbidding trespass are displayed at
intervals not less than three to the mile along all exterior boundaries
and at all roads and trails entering the lands.”101
Thus, a notice identifying itself as “Private Property. Stay Off,” is
intended to shape the law’s understanding of the viewer’s conduct
subsequent to viewing the notice. Some state statutes define a criminal
trespass be committed “knowingly.” A “conspicuous” notice typically
suffices to establish knowledge.102
The power of a notice also depends upon the accuracy of the
conveyed information. A notice which states misinformation has no
power. In the preceding example, a notice which states, “This is Private
Property. Stay Off” has the power to characterize the notice-recipient’s
behavior under the law only if the property is in fact private property.
The effectiveness of the notice derives from the authority of the
property owner.
The determination of whether a notice has adhered to the
requirements of form is objectively and not subjectively determined. A
notice which is poorly worded may be deemed legally ineffective. A
vague warning label, for example, will not be effective as a defense in
a product liability claim.103 The Restatement (Third) of Torts states:

100

FLA. STAT. § 810.09 (1)(a)(1) (effective Oct.1, 2018).
CAL. PENAL CODE §602.8(a) (West 2004).
102
See United States v. Gomez, No. 09 CR. 408, 2010 WL 431878, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
8, 2010) (stating that “New York Penal Law” requires that trespass be committed
“knowingly” and that “[k]nowledge of the trespass is assumed if ‘notice [of the
trespass] is given by posting in a conspicuous manner’”).
103
Lightolier, A Div. of Genlyte Thomas Grp., LLC v. Hoon, 387 Md. App. Ct. 539,
558 (2005) (“[W]arnings on products that are vague or otherwise difficult to
understand shall not generally have the effect of barring a product liability claim when
those warnings go unheeded. For example, if the non-IC rated fixtures at issue here
merely had a warning label affixed to them stating ‘Warning-Risk of Fire’ and nothing
more, it might constitute such a generalized warning that in essence it might not warn
at all.”).
101
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Even if a warning is provided, a defendant still can be negligent if the warning is not adequate; if its content does not
include the relevant information or if its form is not reasonably effective in expressing this information . . . . [M]any . . .
warnings must be posted in public places and quickly responded to by potential victims. These warnings hence are
properly simple and straightforward in the information they
contain.104
The power of the notice may not exceed the power of the property
owner. The property owner may not, for example, conjure up a
punishment for trespassing. The punishment for trespassing is
established by the government, not the individual property owner.
The notice must contain accurate descriptive information. It must also
accurately explain the consequences of certain conduct. A property
owner is not the master of the universe, so the property owner’s power
is limited to the exercise of property rights. A notice cannot state,
“Private Property. Violators Will Be Subject to a $10,000 Fine” if the
law permits only a 100-dollar fine. The power to establish penalties
belongs to the government and not private individuals—even if the
violation occurs on an individual’s private property.
2. Licenses
Although some notices are licenses, a notice and a license have
distinct meanings. A license may be communicated in a form that is
not a notice, such as an agreement or an oral statement.105 A license
may be limited, or it may be broad.106 It may additionally be subject to
conditions.107 These conditions may be drafted in such a way that a
failure by the licensee to abide by them means that the licensee’s
permission is revoked.108 Thus, a license protects the licensee by
providing a defense against a trespass or infringement claim. A license
104

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 18 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2005).
See ROBERT W. GOMULKIEWICZ, XUAN-THAO NGUYEN & DANIELLE CONWAY-JONES,
LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND APPLICATION 3 (2008) (Licenses come
with many labels. Depending upon the setting, they may be called covenants not to
sue, permissions, releases, waivers, clearances, assignments or sales. Not only do
licenses come with many labels, they come in a variety of styles . . . The software
industry tends to use written licenses . . . The movie industry often operates informally
with oral permissions.”).
106
Id. (“A ‘license’ is a grant of permission. In everyday life, people encounter
many types of licenses.”).
107
Nancy S. Kim, Revisiting the License v. Sale Conundrum, 54 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101,
136–38 (2020) (discussing the interpretation and effect of conditions on licenses).
108
Id.
105
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may also give rise to an estoppel defense if it was reasonable for the
licensee to rely upon the license.
A license may be granted relating to property that is tangible or
intangible. In consumer transactions, the use of a license is common
with intangible property. In a marketplace dominated by digital and
digitally enhanced goods and services, licenses have become an
integral part of transactions. Many products today, and likely even
more in the future, bundle intangible licensed property, such as
software or digital content, with a tangible product that is sold.109 Just
as a notice is distinct from a contract, however, a license is distinct from
a license agreement.
A licensee who has been granted a license that was not part of a
bargain (i.e., not part of a license agreement) has no rights against the
licensor and cannot impose any obligations upon the licensor
independent of the obligations the licensor already has under existing
law.110 Accordingly, a license may be revoked at any time for any reason
unless it is part of a contract, or it has been reasonably relied upon.111
A licensor may condition the use of its property so that if the licensee
fails to adhere to those conditions, the scope of the license is exceeded,
and the licensor may invoke its rights of ownership (i.e., in a suit for
infringement or trespass).112 The licensor may, in most cases, also
revoke the license at will, subject to equitable principles relating to due
process and notice.113 The notable exception is where the license is
part of a bargain.114 A license agreement differs from a license because
it is part of an exchange of promises.115
A license grants permission to the licensee that may be as broad
or as narrow as the licensor chooses. The licensor may impose
conditions upon that permission and may revoke permission. A
license, however, cannot limit or reallocate the licensee’s rights unless

109

See JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW DIGITAL
SERFDOM 1–3, 10 (2017); AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF
OWNERSHIP: PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 1–4 (Laura DeNardis &
Michael Zimmer eds., 2016).
110
This is an observation I have made in a previous article. Kim, supra note 107, at
142–56.
111
Id. at 138–144.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 141–156.
114
Id.
115
Id.
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the licensee agrees.116 For example, a license can allow the licensee to
make and distribute two copies of a copyrighted work. It cannot,
however, take away the licensee’s first-sale right if the licensee
purchased that work unless the licensee has agreed to it as part of a
bargained-for exchange.
Adhesive licensing terms can be particularly problematic if they
purport to create a license agreement and are unsigned. The grant of
the license may be conditioned upon acceptance to the agreement.
Notwithstanding the language, the licensor does not, and cannot,
unilaterally declare that a license agreement exists; rather, the
existence of a license agreement depends upon two factors. The first
is whether the licensee assented to the agreement.117 If the terms are
unsigned, the licensor must present the license agreement in such a
way that the licensee’s conduct may be clearly and unambiguously
interpreted as assent to the terms of the agreement.118 As with notices,
the rolling contract or pay-first-terms-later model undermines
certainty. Second, even if a contract is formed and accepted by the
licensee, the scope and validity of the license depend upon the precise
granting language and whether it expressly conditions the license
grant upon agreement to other terms. If it does not, the license may
be valid even if the licensee breaches other terms of the agreement.119
In other words, a breach of contract is not the same as an infringement
of the license granted pursuant to the contract.120
Unsigned adhesive licensing terms that identify as “agreements”
involve two doctrinal issues; whether a contract has been formed, and
the interpretation of a clause as a covenant or a condition. Thus, the
validity of a license agreement depends upon doctrinal rules of
formation (offer, acceptance, consideration, mutual assent, and no
invalidating defenses) and those of contract interpretation and
construction
(including
interpretive
preferences
against
116
Id. at 139–40 (noting that a party’s “ownership rights determine the types of
restrictions” that may be unilaterally placed on a transaction without the other party’s
consent).
117
See id. at 154–57 (discussing how to read and interpret adhesive licensing terms).
118
Specht v. Netscape Comm’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Reasonably
conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and unambiguous manifestation
of assent to those terms by consumers are essential if electronic bargaining is to have
integrity and credibility.”).
119
See, e.g., United States Naval Inst. v. Charter Commc’ns, 936 F.2d 692, 696 (2d
Cir. 1991) (determining that licensee’s premature publication of book did not
infringe copyright but breached contract).
120
Id.
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forfeitures).121 A license agreement that fails as a contract because it is
not properly formed may still be effective as a license, just as the
licensee’s failure to abide by a contractual provision may be a breach
but not an infringement.
A license protects both the licensee and the licensor. A license
grant protects the licensee from an infringement claim by the licensor
where the licensee uses the underlying intellectual property without a
preexisting right to do so. The license protects the licensor where the
licensee exceeds the scope of the license by delineating the permissible
boundaries of use. Because a license derives from the authority of the
licensor, it may be effective regardless of its validity as a contract.
3. Express and Implied Contracts
A contract requires consent, which is typically expressed verbally
or in a writing which leaves little doubt. But how can a court assess
whether a party has consented where the party has not done so
explicitly?
Consent may be manifested through conduct,122 which is
interpreted through an objective lens by determining whether a
reasonable person would have thought the offeree’s conduct meant
assent. Conduct constitutes acceptance only if the party engaging in
conduct intends to accept the benefits on the terms offered.123 The
objective standard means that the assent is constructive because the
offeree may not have actually intended to assent even though a
reasonable person would have thought otherwise. When a party signs
a document, even if it is an adhesive form, the duty to read applies and
121

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 227(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981) (noting that with
respect to conditions, “an interpretation is preferred that will reduce the obligee’s risk
of forfeiture, unless the event is within the obligee’s control or the circumstances
indicate that he has assumed the risk.”).
122
See id. § 69(1)(a) (silence may constitute acceptance of an offer “[w]here an
offeree takes the benefit of offered services with reasonable opportunity to reject them
and reason to know that they were offered with the expectation of compensation”); see
also id. § 55 cmt. b (“Performance may be thus complete when the offer takes the form
of a tender of money or other property; indeed, the acceptance of the offer may then
be implied from the fact that the offeree takes the offered benefits, without more.”)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 69).
123
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 19(2) (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“The conduct of
a party is not effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage in
the conduct and knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer from his
conduct that he assents.”); Karlin v. Avis, 457 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1972) (“An offeror
has no power to transform an offeree’s silence into acceptance when the offeree does
not intend to accept the offer.”).
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so the party is presumed to have read the terms and consented to them.
Where, however, adhesive terms are not signed, courts must determine
whether the adherent’s conduct constituted assent to the terms. The
court’s assessment of conduct should include whether the adherent
intended to accept the terms.124 This does not mean that the adherent
read the terms or even that the adherent intended to enter into a
contract. It does mean, however, that the adherent intended to engage
in the conduct and that a reasonable person, based on the adherent’s
conduct, believed the adherent meant to accept.125
There are two types of implied contracts: implied-in-fact and
implied-in-law. An implied-in-fact contract is an actual contract which
is created where the parties intended to enter into a contract but did
not expressly agree to the terms.126 Because a finding of an implied-infact contract results in the imposition of affirmative contractual
obligations, the parties must have intended to accept those
obligations.127 In accordance with an objective standard, it is sufficient
if a reasonable person believed their conduct manifested consent.
By contrast, an implied-in-law contract is not an actual contract
because the parties did not intend to enter into binding obligations,
nor did they act in a way that a reasonable person would believe
manifests assent; rather, the court imposes these obligations in the
interest of equity.128 For this reason, an implied-in-law contract may
also be referred to as a quasi-contract because although it resembles a
contract due to the imposition of legal obligations, it lacks the essential
ingredient of intent. The rationale for the imposition of legal
124

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 19(2) (AM. L. INST. 1981).
Id.
126
See Com. P’ship 8098 Ltd. v. Equity Contracting Co., 695 So. 2d 383, 385 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (describing implied in fact contract as an “enforceable contract”
that is “based on a tacit promise, one that is inferred in whole or in part from the
parties’ conduct, not solely from the words”).
127
See, e.g., Young v. Young, 191 P.3d 1258, 1262–63 (Wash. 2008) (noting that an
implied in fact contract arises from circumstances which “show a mutual intention on
the part of the parties to contract with each other.”) (citations omitted); Doe v. Wash.
& Lee Univ., 439 F. Supp. 3d 784, 791 (W.D. Va. 2020) (“A contract implied in fact is
a true contract, differing from an express contract only in the lack of express terms
and conditions. Without the intent to contract, a court cannot find a contract implied
in fact.”).
128
See Com. P’ship, 695 So. 2d at 386 (“A contract implied in law is a legal fiction, an
obligation created by the law without regard to the parties’ expression of assent by
their words or conduct. . . . The fiction was adopted to provide a remedy where one
party was unjustly enriched, where that party received a benefit under circumstances
that made it unjust to retain it without giving compensation.”).
125
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obligations is not objectively determined intent, but fairness and the
avoidance of injustice.129
Although readily distinguishable in theory, in practice,
determining whether a case calls for a finding of an implied-in-fact or
an implied-in-law contract is much more difficult, and courts have
often confused the two.130 Confusion is understandable given that the
objective standard seems to correspond to the same circumstances that
warrant equitable action. If X acts in a way that would lead a reasonable
person to believe X had assented to the terms of a contract, then it also
seems fair to hold X to the contract. But more importantly and
problematically, it is not always clear whether a reasonable person would
believe X had assented to the terms of the contract. If X is building a
wall between X’s house and Y’s house, would a reasonable person think
that Y had agreed to pay X for doing so? It likely depends upon the
past interactions between X and Y and the norms that govern where
their interaction occurs. It may be that Y wants the wall and believes
that it will enhance the value of Y’s house. Y may compliment X on the
work and express words of gratitude (e.g., “I’m so glad that you are
building this wall for us!”) or behavior (passing with a friendly smile
and nod) that indicate an intent to pay for it even though terms have
not been expressly discussed.
By contrast, if Y does not wish to pay for the wall, Y may not say
anything about it. Instead, Y may pass the wall every day without
comment while X is working on it. In the former case, there is an
implied-in-fact contract because Y’s conduct would lead a reasonable
person to believe that Y has assented to the contract even though terms
were not expressly discussed. In the latter case, Y has not assented to
the contract because Y’s conduct would not lead a reasonable person
to believe that Y has consented. Yet, a court might require Y to pay for
half of the wall in both scenarios. In the first scenario, because Y has
impliedly agreed and in the second scenario, because it is fair to do so
given that Y has received the benefit of the wall and under the
circumstances, should have said something if Y did not intend to pay
for it.

129
Id. See also Archon Constr. Co. v. U.S. Shelter, L.L.C., 78 N.E.3d 1067, 1074 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2017) (“A quasi-contract, or contract implied in law, is one in which no actual
agreement between the parties occurred, but a duty is imposed to prevent injustice.”)
(citations omitted).
130
Com. P’ship, 695 So. 2d at 387 (“The blurring of the distinction between contract
implied in fact and quasi contract has been exacerbated by the potential for both
theories to apply to the same factual setting.”).
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4. Unilateral Contracts and Reverse Unilateral Contracts
A basic premise of contract law is that contracts must be supported
by consideration, meaning that each party must make a promise in
exchange for the promise or performance of the other party.131 Courts
have long held that either both parties are bound to their promises or
neither is bound.132 A promise that does not bind the promisor is
illusory and lacks mutuality.133 Contracts lacking mutuality are void for
want of consideration.134
Clauses which grant one party the discretion to unilaterally
modify the contract raise the problem of mutuality because the party
is not actually bound to its promise if it has the power to change the
terms at any time. The court’s interpretative approach is an important
factor affecting whether a court is likely to enforce such a clause. A
primarily textual approach focuses on the language of the clause.
Courts that adopt this approach focus on whether the unilateral
modification clause contains constraints on discretionary authority.135
These courts tend to uphold unilateral modification clauses if they
contain a notice period and only apply prospectively.136 In the absence
of a notice period, courts will find such clauses unenforceable.137 On
the other hand, a primarily contextual approach determines whether
the party intended to enter into the contract and, if so, reads into the
131

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 17(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“[T]he
formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual
assent to the exchange and a consideration.”).
132
Sumners v. Serv. Vending Co., 102 S.W.3d 37, 41 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003)
(“[N]either party is bound unless both are bound.”) (citations omitted); DiCosola v.
Ryan, 44 N.E.3d 556, 562 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (“[P]romises must be binding on both
parties or the contract fails for want of consideration . . . . That is to say, either both
parties to the agreement are bound or neither is bound.”).
133
DiCosola, 44 N.E.3d at 562 (“An illusory promise appears to be a promise, but in
actuality the promisor has not agreed to do anything.”).
134
See Rosenberg v. Lawrence, 541 So. 2d 1204, 1206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that “[t]he illusory nature of [the] promise made that promise void”).
135
See Quality Prods. & Concepts Co. v. Nagel Precision, Inc., 666 N.W.2d 251, 257–
58 (Mich. 2003) (holding that “the freedom to contract does not authorize a party to
unilaterally alter an existing bilateral agreement. Rather a party alleging waiver or
modification must establish a mutual intention of the parties to waive or modify the
original contract.”) (citations omitted).
136
Citizens Telecomms. Co. of W. Va. v. Sheridan, 799 S.E.2d 144, 152 (W. Va.
2017) (holding that the company “provided reasonable notice to its customers of its
changes to the unilateral contract” and that customers assented to the changes by
continuing to subscribe to the service).
137
Id. at 151.
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clause an implied duty of good faith which constrains the discretionary
authority of the drafter.138
Perhaps the most important factor affecting whether a
modification at-will clause is enforceable is the nature of the
transaction governed by the clause. Modification at-will clauses in
relational contracts are much more likely to be upheld than those in
contracts governing discrete transactions because prior notice and
continuation of services by the adherent is typically required.139
Relational contracts are ongoing and govern future events over an
extended period of time. Given the inability to predict future business
needs, modification at-will clauses in long-term services contracts may
be reasonable. If modifications apply only prospectively and subject to
a notice period, the adherent may not suffer a forfeiture.140 Often,
however, the adherent has sunk costs and no alternative service. Even
if there is an alternative service, the adherent may incur switching
costs. Another important factor to consider is whether there are
regulations or statutes that permit, either expressly or implicitly, at-will
clauses in that type of transaction. For example, legislation expressly
permits banks to modify the terms of credit card agreements but
regulates the substance of those terms and the form in which they are
presented.141

138

Gonzalez v. Interstate Cleaning Corp., No. 19-CV-07307, 2020 WL 1891789, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2020) (noting that “California courts have made clear that
unilateral modification terms are not substantively unconscionable because the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing” limits this discretion) (citations
omitted).
139
See National Fed’n of the Blind v. The Container Store, Inc., 904 F.3d 70, 85 (1st
Cir. 2018) (determining an arbitration provision to be an illusory promise because it
contained a modification at will provision); Quality Prods. and Concepts v. Nagel
Precision, Inc., 469 Mich. 362, 365 (2003) (“the principle of freedom of contract does
not permit a party unilaterally to alter the original contract.”). Cf. Asmus v. Pacific Bell
96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179, 184 (June 1, 2000) (“The mutuality of obligation principle
requiring new consideration for contract termination applies to bilateral contracts
only.”).
140
See Vernon v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1153–1156 (D.
Colo. 2012) (upholding modification at will provisions); In re Zappos.com, Inc., 893 F.
Supp. 2d 1058, 1065 (D. Nev. 2012) (“Most federal courts that have considered this
issue have held that if a party retains the unilateral, unrestricted right to terminate the
arbitration agreement, it is illusory and unenforceable, especially where there is no
obligation to receive consent from, or even notify the other parties to the contract.”).
141
See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.52–1026.61 (2022); Credit Card Accountability
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, §§101–02, 123 Stat.
1734, 1735–41.
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Many contracts containing modification at-will clauses are more
accurately characterized as unilateral contracts or reverse unilateral
contracts. Unilateral contracts are promises made in return for
performance. Reverse unilateral contracts are those where “the
offeror’s performance is completed when the offeree’s promise is
made.”142 Acceptance of the offer is “implied from the fact that the
offeree takes the offered benefits, without more.”143 Furthermore, as
the Restatement makes clear, these types of contracts “often involve
incidental promises by the performing offeror, and in that event the
word ‘unilateral’ is not entirely appropriate.”144
In the past, this type of contract was a “rare species of
agreement”145 and was typically used for insurance policies and offers
to lend money.146 But a more common digital age example is the
ubiquitous TOS In Register.com v. Verio, for example—the leading case
enforcing the browsewrap form—the court stated that “[i]t is standard
contract doctrine that when a benefit is offered subject to stated
conditions, and the offeree makes a decision to take the benefit with
knowledge of the terms of the offer, the taking constitutes an
acceptance of the terms, which accordingly become binding on the
offeree.”147 Reverse unilateral contracts combine aspects of both
implied-in-fact and unilateral contracts, which may be what confounds
courts when they evaluate TOS.
Instead of analyzing them as bilateral contracts, courts should
analyze TOS as reverse unilateral contracts where the website is
providing the service and stating the conditions regarding the
provisions of those services. The offeree accepts those terms by using

142

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 55 (AM. L. INST. 1981); see also id. § 55 cmt.
a (“It is possible to offer a performance without making any promise. . . . [W]here a
non-promissory offer is accepted by promise, there is a contract if the requirements
other than manifestation of mutual assent are met. Since the contract formed by a
performance in response to an offer of a promise such as an offer of reward is often
called a ‘unilateral contract,’ the type of contract referred to in this Section is
sometimes referred to as a ‘reverse unilateral contract.’ Contracts so referred to often
involve incidental promises by the performing offeror, and in that event the word
‘unilateral’ is not entirely appropriate.”).
143
Id. § 55 cmt. b.
144
Id. § 55 cmt. a.
145
E. ALAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 113 §3.3 n.4. (3d ed. 1999).
146
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. §55, illus. 1 & 2.
147
356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004) (using language that mirrors language in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTS. §55 cmt. b).
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the services. The contract then terminates after the offeree uses the
services.
5. Waivers (Exculpatory Agreements and Limitations of
Liability)
An exculpatory agreement is a particular type of contract which
has a specific purpose: to relinquish a right possessed by the waiving
party.148 Although often referred to as a “waiver,” it should not be
confused with the act of waiving one’s contractual rights, which is also
referred to as a “waiver.” Unfortunately, the terms are used
interchangeably which often causes confusion. One may unilaterally
waive one’s rights and one may unilaterally retract a waiver of one’s
rights under a contract, provided the other party has not detrimentally
relied upon the waiver.149
An exculpatory agreement involves a waiver of rights that the
agreement does not explicitly create.150 The rights are not the product
of private ordering, but they are subject to private ordering.151 In other

148
McKinney v. Castleman, 968 N.E. 2d 185, 188 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (“An
exculpatory agreement constitutes an express assumption of risk wherein one party
consents to relieve another party of a particular obligation.”); Patterson v. Powder
Monarch, LLC, 926 F.3d 633, 636–37 (10th Cir. 2019) (exculpatory agreement
released ski resort from tort liability and all claims by holder); Stelluti v. Casapenn
Enters., 1 A.3d 678, 688–9 (N.J. 2010) (exculpatory agreement waives “statutorily
imposed duty”).
149
See RBC Nice Bearings, Inc. v. SKF USA, Inc., 123 A.3d 417, 425–26 (Conn. 2015)
(stating that while a contractual modification is the result of bilateral action, “a waiver
may be effectuated by one party” and relatedly “whereas the modification of a contract
may not be revoked without the consent of both parties, the obligee may, under certain
circumstances unilaterally retract its waiver of a contractual requirement”) (citations
omitted); Cornerstone Equip. Leasing, Inc. v. MacLeod, 247 P.3d 790, 796 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2011) (“A waiver can be unilateral and without consideration. . . . When a waiver
is given without consideration, the waiving party may reinstate the rights that have
been waived upon reasonable notice that gives a reasonable opportunity to comply.”);
U.C.C. §2-209(5) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977) (“A party who has made a
waiver affecting an executory portion of the contract may retract the waiver by
reasonable notification received by the other party that strict performance will be
required of any term waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material
change of position in reliance on the waiver.”).
150
See supra note 152. Although each party to a contract may waive its rights under
that contract, as previously noted, the act of waiving is not the same thing as a promise
to waive one’s rights in the future.
151
See generally Zahra Takhshid, Assumption of Risk in Consumer Contracts and the
Distraction of Unconscionability, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183 (2021) (explaining how courts
focusing increasingly on an unconscionability analysis rather than public policy when
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words, they are rights that the waiving party has under law other than
contract law.152 Often, that is tort law.
As with many areas of the law, there are competing articulated
objectives of tort law.153 It is universally accepted, however, that tort
law should compensate victims and deter harmful behavior.
Exculpatory agreements typically involve waivers of the adherent’s
right to sue for negligent injury in exchange for the right to participate
in the activity that risks causing the injury. Exculpatory agreements
thus deprive the victim of compensation in the case of accidents and
consequently, may also undermine the deterrent objective of tort law.
Exculpatory agreements are typically one or two paragraphs and
signed by the adhering party. For example, a participant in a risky
activity, such as skydiving, may be asked to sign an exculpatory
agreement waiving the participant’s rights to sue the skydiving outfit
for injuries as a condition to being permitted to participate in the
activity.
While exculpatory agreements are typically short, standalone
contracts and limited to participation in a single activity, exculpatory
clauses may be contained in longer contracts governing the exchange
of multiple promises. For example, a provision waiving a party’s right
to sue in a U.S. court may be buried at the end of a fifty-page
distribution agreement between two global corporations, which
includes many other provisions.
Courts pay special attention to exculpatory clauses and
agreements because they extract rights which are not created by the
parties even if they may be relinquished through the vehicle of a
contract. Accordingly, the role of the contract—and the justification
that is usually given for enforcing that contract—is more tenuous. The
primary justification for enforcing contracts is that the parties have
assessed their respective positions and have determined that they will
acquire gains from the transaction. Each agrees to undertake certain
duties and give up certain rights as part of that transaction.
By contrast, with an exculpatory agreement, one of the parties is
not undertaking an obligation. Instead, that party is agreeing to
assessing exculpatory clauses has allowed defendants to avoid responsibility for
negligence through the use of boilerplate releases).
152
Parties generally do not have the authority to agree to waive rights that fall under
the domain of public law, such as crimes committed against them, although they may
waive or decline to enforce their rights when the violation occurs.
153
See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON
TORTS 15–25 (2d ed. 2016); MARK A. GEISTFELD, ESSENTIALS: TORT LAW 67–100 (2008).
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relieve the other party of liability for failing to perform a duty that
society has deemed should be owed. Because the rights being waived
pertain to bodily injuries and property damages, the consent
conditions must be robust. Generally, the law recognizes that one’s
interest in preserving bodily integrity is greater than one’s interest in
property.154
Courts tend to determine that an exculpatory agreement violates
public policy if there is a lack of bargaining power.155 The California
Supreme Court in Tunkl v. Regents of University of California explained
that “no public policy opposes private, voluntary transactions in which
one party, for a consideration, agrees to shoulder a risk which the law
would otherwise have placed upon the other party.”156 It added,
however, that in certain situations,
the releasing party does not really acquiesce voluntarily in
the contractual shifting of the risk, nor can he be reasonably
certain that he receives an adequate consideration for the
transfer. Since the service is one which each member of the
public, presently or potentially, may find essential to him, he
faces, despite his economic inability to do so, the prospect of
a compulsory assumption of the risk of another’s negligence.
The public policy of this state has been, in substance, to posit
the risk of negligence upon the actor; in instances in which
this policy has been abandoned, it has generally been to allow or require that the risk shift to another party better or
equally able to bear it, not to shift the risk to the weak bargainer.157
In addition to entering into the exculpatory agreement
voluntarily, the adherent must understand the meaning of doing so.
As one court noted, exculpatory agreements must “expressly or
unequivocally demonstrate[] on its face an unambiguous intention to

154

See, e.g., Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Iowa 1971) (“[T]he law has always
placed a higher value upon human safety than upon mere rights in property[.]”)
(citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 116–18 (3d ed. 1964)).
155
See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 44647 (Cal. 1963);
Cumberland Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Bell Cnty. Coal Corp., 238 S.W.3d 644, 653 (Ky.
2007) (noting that courts have invalidated exculpatory clauses where there was a
“major disparity in bargaining power between the parties”); Blake D. Morant, Contracts
Limiting Liability: A Paradox with Tacit Solutions, 69 TUL. L. REV. 715, 719 (1995)
(proposing a framework in contrast to the present one that emphasizes “public policy
concerns related to paternalism”).
156
Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 446.
157
Id. at 446–47.

128

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:85

shield” the wrongdoer from their own alleged negligence.158 Another
court noted that exculpatory contracts, while not invalid per se, “are
disfavored and are strictly construed against the party relying upon
them” so that “[t]he wording of the release must be ‘so clear and
understandable that an ordinarily prudent and knowledgeable party
to it will know what he or she is contracting away; it must be
unmistakable.’”159
6. The Importance of Disentangling Terms
Adhesive consumer form contracts fall into an array of different
categories. Sometimes adhesive terms are unilateral contract terms
and not terms for bilateral contracts.160 Often, adhesive terms are not
“contracts” at all; nor are they always oppressive. A sign that says,
“Visitors Are Welcome to Quench Their Thirst with the Drinking
Fountain on My Property” is adhesive, but it is not oppressive because
visitors do not have to use the drinking fountain. Adhesive terms may
not be coercive either—they may simply provide information: “You Are
Entering Private Property.” Even if the adherent’s actions are
constrained because of the adhesive term, it may not be the adhesive
term itself which is the source of the constraint. For example, a sign
that states, “Stay Off Property. Trespassers Will Be Prosecuted” is not
coercive because it is not eliminating a right that the adherent has; it
is the underlying trespassing statute which establishes the constraint.
The adhesive term merely provides information about it.
Furthermore, adhesive terms may grant rights which the adherent
may not otherwise have. A simple grant of rights does not require
consent. A license to make two copies of the licensor’s copyrighted
work does not require consent because it is only bestowing a right; it is
not taking one away. A license agreement, however, requires consent
because it grants rights in exchange for something that the licensee is
not otherwise obligated to give up.
A bailment illustrates the importance of disentangling adhesive
terms given the legal implications. A bailment occurs where goods are
delivered by one (the bailor) to another (the bailee) with the
158

Garvine v. Maryland, No. 17-01013, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45592, at *5 (D. Md.
Mar. 20, 2019).
159
Hargis v. Baize, 168 S.W.3d 36, 47 (Ky. 2005) (citing City of Hazard Mun. Hous.
Comm’n v. Hinch, 411 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Ky. 1967); Cobb v. Gulf Refining Co., 145
S.W.2d 96, 99 (Ky. 1940)); id. (quoting 57A AM. JUR. 2D, Negligence § 52 (2004)).
160
More precisely, many adhesive terms are “reverse unilateral contracts.” See supra
Part III.B.4.
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understanding that the goods will be returned to the bailor.161 The
bailor must deliver exclusive possession and control—but not title—of
the property to the bailee, and the bailee must voluntarily and
knowingly accept the property with the understanding that it must be
returned as directed by the bailor.162 For example, when X drops X’s
clothing off at a dry cleaner, X creates a bailment. “A bailment gives
rise to the duty of exercising ordinary care in keeping and
safeguarding the property.”163
Bailment contracts create the underlying duties of the bailee but
typically also contain terms that limit the bailee’s liability or exculpate
the bailee.164 Generally, courts have determined exculpatory clauses
in bailment contracts to be void or unenforceable.165 Even where
exculpatory clauses are permissible in bailment contracts, they must be
strictly construed against the party seeking to escape liability.166
As the authors of a leading treatise on torts noted, “negligence
/conversion/contract theories are often rolled up together” in
bailment cases, but “[c]ontract, express or implied, . . . is the
161
Bailment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) (“A delivery of goods or
personal property, by one person to another, in trust for the execution of a special
object upon or in relation to such goods, beneficial either to the bailor or bailee or
both, and upon a contract, express or implied, to perform the trust and carry out such
object, and thereupon either to redeliver the goods to the bailor or otherwise dispose
of the same in conformity with the purpose of the trust.”). See also 8 C.J.S. Bailments §
1 (1962) (defining bailment as “an agreement, either express or implied, that one
person will entrust personal property to another for a specific purpose and that, when
the purpose is accomplished, the bailee will return the property to the bailor or
otherwise deal with it according to the bailor’s directions, or keep it until the bailor
reclaims it, as the case may be.”).
162
Weissman v. City of New York, 860 N.Y.S.2d 393, 395–96 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 2008)
(determining that a bailment was created “when defendant took custody of the kayaks
by retaining the key and controlling access to the kayaks, notifying users that this was
the new temporary policy, promising better security and urging claimant to keep his
kayaks there because of the new security measures”); Snyder v. Four Winds Sailboat
Ctr., Ltd., 701 F.2d 251, 252–53 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding a bailment was created when
the marina agreed to store boat and had the keys).
163
Weissman, 860 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
164
As with other adhesive form contracts, a bailment contract may also be regulated
by state statute. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1630.5 (1970) (“The provisions of any
contract of bailment for the parking or storage of a motor vehicle shall not exempt
the bailee from liability, either in whole or in part, for the theft of any motor vehicle,
when such motor vehicle is parked or stored with such bailee, and the keys are
required by such bailee to be left in the parked or stored vehicle.”).
165
See, e.g., id.; see also DOBBS ET AL., supra note 153, at 120.
166
Weissman, 860 N.Y.S.2d at 396 (“Although exculpatory clauses are enforceable,
they are strictly construed against the party seeking exemption from liability.”).
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foundation of the bailment.”167 A conversion occurs where one makes
an unauthorized transfer of the property of another or refuses to
return goods as required.168 Because a bailment contract establishes
the boundaries of the bailee’s obligations, a bailee who performs in
accordance with the contract is not liable in tort for conversion.169 If,
however, the bailee is in noncompliance with the terms of the bailment
contract, the bailor may sue in contract or in tort, depending upon
whether the facts support a claim for conversion.170 In other words,
the bailment contract establishes the bailee’s duties, which, in turn,
determines whether the bailor has a tort claim. If so, the bailor may
choose to sue in tort instead of under the contract.171 Furthermore, a
notice may affect whether a bailment or a license is created. A notice
in a parking garage may indicate whether the owner of a car must leave
the keys with an attendant (creating a bailment) or take the keys
(creating a license by the garage owner permitting the car owner to
park in the garage).
A notice which seeks to exercise some control over the recipient’s
behavior is only effective while the recipient is enjoying the benefits of
the other party’s property. Its terms are enforceable only as far as they
involve what the property owner can and cannot do while the recipient
is using the property. If the property owner wishes to restrict the rights
of the recipient after the recipient has stopped receiving the benefits
of the property, then the property owner and the recipient must have
entered into a contract.
A notice is a form of due process;172 it informs the recipient
/viewer of the property owner’s rights and whether the property owner

167

DOBBS ET AL., supra note 153, at 118–19.
Id. at 116–17.
169
Id. at 11621.
170
Id. at 121 (noting that courts have repeatedly stated that a “bailee has the option
of suing on the contract or in tort or for restitution”).
171
Generally, the economic loss doctrine does not apply to bailment cases. Id. As
noted, however, “some courts have applied the rules for pure economic loss cases to
ordinary conversions of tangible property” and, in doing so, “may have made overly
broad statements . . . without considering the specific bailment situation where the
plaintiff traditionally has the option to sue in tort and where exculpatory clauses are
often rejected.” Id. at 121–22.
172
See Stenger v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 743 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Neb. 2008)
(“Procedural due process limits the ability of the government to deprive people of
interests which constitute ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within eh meaning of the Due
Process Clause and requires that parties deprived of such interests be provided
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.”).
168
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intends to exercise the full extent of those rights.173 A notice can grant
permission and condition of that permission on adherence to certain
terms. Such grants of permission are licenses.174 If, however, the
adherent assents to adhesive terms, the terms are binding as contracts.
If the adherent does not assent to the adhesive terms, they are binding
only if the drafter has authority to impose the terms and there is due
process in the form of notice.175 The drafter has authority to impose
terms if they relate to the use of the drafter’s property provided that they
do not seek anything in return from the adherent (i.e., they do not
involve an exchange) or penalize the adherent for infringement or
trespass. In the latter case, due process requires reasonable notice of
the condition.
In the online context, however, some courts have determined that
notice of notice suffices.176 The demure hyperlink that states Terms and
Conditions is confused with the notice itself, which is not viewable at
the time of acceptance and thus should not be considered contractual.
This standard conflates contracts with notices and, in doing so,
constructs a version of consent that is far removed from reality. Under
this fantastical version of consent, adherents are expected to act the
way no reasonable person would act and no reasonable drafter should
expect them to act.
A taxonomy provides a classification system to understand
adhesive terms. A taxonomy is definitional, however, and requires a
process that incorporates it. The first step in the process involves
determining the ostensible purpose that the adhesive terms serves. Do
they provide information, grant permission, reallocate rights, or
impose obligations on the adherent? The second step is to assess the
authority of the drafter. Does the drafter—as a matter of property
173

See e.g., State v. Pixley, 200 A.3d 174, 177 (Vt. 2018) (noting that under Vermont
law, a person commits trespass if “without legal authority or the consent of the person
in lawful possession he or she enters or remains on land or in any place as to which
notice against trespass is given”). The court further noted that the statute thus
required two elements: “first, the license element – that the person is entering the
land ‘without legal authority” or consent, and second, the notice element – that notice
against trespass is provided for the property in question.” Id.
174
Id. at 177–179; see also Joseph Bros. Co. v. Dunn Bros., 148 N.E.3d 1260, 1268
(Ohio Ct. App. 2019) (“A license ‘is a privilege given to an individual to do an act upon
the land of another without possessing any interest therein and is usually terminable at
the will of the licensor.”).
175
See Joseph Bros. Co., 148 N.E.3d at 1276 (noting that a property owner cannot sue
for trespass “when the purported trespasser holds an easement to the property”).
176
See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding a
shrinkwrap agreement).
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rules—have the authority to unilaterally impose the term on the
adherent? If not, did the drafter obtain the adherent’s consent to the
disputed term so that it is fair to find contract formation? Consent is
essential if the drafter did not have the authority to unilaterally impose
the term. One party cannot simply insist that adhesive terms are a
contract; both parties must agree. The adherent’s consent may be
implied where the terms are immediately and unavoidably viewable
and the adherent proceeds with an activity that the adherent was not
otherwise privileged to do. On the other hand, terms that are not
immediately visible should not be part of the contract unless the
adherent has specifically assented to them.177
In Kemenosh v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,178 the court stated that “the
deficiency in Uber’s registration process is not its inconspicuousness
but rather its failure to adequately communicate an offer to arbitrate
in a definite manner, so as to create a meeting of the minds.”179
Shedding more light on the specific factors that may reflect adequate
communication, the court stated:
It is generally understood that Uber offers transportation in
exchange for money. . . . Therefore, the words “by creating
an Uber account you are agreeing to the Terms of Service
and Privacy Policy” convey that by creating an Uber account
one is agreeing to pay money in exchange for transportation,
and to the terms of a privacy policy. They do not convey an
offer to arbitrate, or notify the user in any way that the offered Terms of Service contain a waiver of jury trial and an
arbitration clause.180
Of particular interest, the court noted that
“[w]hile Uber’s arbitration terms were accessible if the user
clicked through the “Terms of Service and Privacy Policy”
link, the hyperlink contained no indication that it contained
further essential terms other than the implicit agreement of
offering transportation in exchange for money and a privacy
policy.181
Furthermore, the court stated that it “cannot accept that a reasonably
prudent cell phone user would know that the terms accessible by the
hyperlink contained a jury trial waiver and an arbitration
177
See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1173 (9th Cir. 2014); Berkson
v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
178
No. 181102703, 2020 WL 254634 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 3, 2020).
179
Id. at *6.
180
Id.
181
Id.
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agreement.”182 Accordingly, the terms of Uber’s offer were “indefinite”
and there was no agreement to arbitrate.183
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR ONLINE NOTICE (AND ANTICIPATED OBJECTIONS)
Adhesive online terms, such as terms of service, are often
identified or labeled as “contracts.” But, as this Article explains, online
adhesive terms are usually not contracts. Courts have conflated the
distinction between notices and contracts, perhaps swayed by the way
companies have self-interestedly identified them.
The current standard of notice and manifestation lacks predictability
and has plagued both consumers and businesses.184 The problem can
be traced to the multiple layers of fiction inherent in a notice and
manifestation standard, which creates a funhouse mirror-like distortive
effect on parties’ behavior. In the physical world, a notice is a sign; in
the online world, a notice is a hyperlink. A tangible notice has physical
constraints that a digital notice does not. Yet, many courts have
ignored the differences between tangible notices and digital ones and
have overlooked how the contracting environment affects the behavior
and perception of the parties.
The criteria used to assess the reasonableness of physical notice
do not readily transfer to the online context. Large font and bold
lettering may be conspicuous on a sign placed near a physical entrance
but can be rather inconspicuous if it is in the interior page of a
document that requires clicking a hyperlink. Furthermore, the digital
form enables companies to sneak contracts upon unsuspecting
consumers as they are completing a transaction. Similar to drip
pricing where additional fees and surcharges are imposed upon the
consumer at various points in the transaction,185 drip contracting
182

Id.
Id. at *6–7.
184
An industry white paper found that overall, the success rate for companies
seeking to enforce their clickwrap agreements was only 60 percent. See PACTSAFE,
CLICKWRAP LITIGATION TRENDS: 2021 REPORT 2 (2021).
185
David Adam Friedman, Regulating Drip Pricing, 31 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 51, 53
(2020) (describing drip pricing as a situation where the “seller first appears to describe
the full price of a defined expected offering, leaving the buyer to discover only later
the nature of the full price and commitment.”); see also Luca v. Wyndham Worldwide
Corp., No. 2:16-CV-00746, 2019 WL 211098, at n.1 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2019) (defining
“drip pricing” as a practice where “the advertised price misleads consumers to believe
that the additional resort fee is simple a ‘tax,’ which is a deceptive act that impacts
consumers’ decision-making.”); Washinton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., No. 1:19-CV-04724,
2020 WL 3058118, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 2020) (defining “drip pricing” as a “trade
183
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imposes terms upon the consumer in bits and pieces so that the
consumer has difficulty understanding the meaning of the legal terms
in the aggregate. Typically, the website lures consumers with an
attractive invitation and a seemingly simply way to accept that
invitation, presenting the consumer with a form to fill with personal
information and allowing them to select merchandise or services
before providing notice that terms apply to the transaction. Unlike
notices in the physical world, in the drip contracting scenario the
company merely provides notice that terms of service govern the
transaction. The notice itself does not provide any useful substantive
information.
The standards and criteria used to assess a notice should reflect
the differences between the online and physical environments.
Physical notices are required to be conspicuous; what conspicuousness
requires is often legislated or regulated and depends upon the
substance of the notice. Physical notice regulation considers the
context in which the notice is presented, including the surrounding
elements. A green sign with green lettering will not be considered
conspicuous if placed against a leafy green bush at the entrance to a
golf course, regardless of the size of the lettering or that it is in all-caps.
Unfortunately, legislators have been slow to impose similar
requirements for online notices.186 Apart from recent legislation in
several states governing privacy and data collection, online notice
regulation is largely absent. This Section proposes standardizing
online notices to make them more efficient, fairer, and more
predictable.
A. Default Rules for Reasonable Notices
A reasonable notice standard is incongruous with a duty to read
because it should be practically impossible to miss the information on
a reasonable notice, thus rendering a duty to read superfluous. A
reasonable notice should be one where seeing the notice is the same
thing as reading it because the message is not only conspicuous but

practice…whereby Defendant initially excludes mandatory resort fees when it
advertises room rates, but then includes those resort fees in the final charges it assesses
customers.”).
186
Woodrow Hartzog observed that “courts have focused almost entirely on the
language in terms of use and privacy policies when analyzing online agreements.”
WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF
NEW TECHNOLOGIES 171 (Harv. Univ. Press 2018) (1978).
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concise and understandable. It is incumbent upon the drafter to
ensure that the notice is reasonable.
A notice that is reasonably presented is conspicuous and makes its
meaning clear. In the online context, this is rarely the case. On the
contrary, online adhesive terms are often obfuscatory, dense, and hard
to find.
They are typically much wordier than their paper
counterparts, accessible only by clicking on a hyperlink, and scattered
across multiple web pages that are often unilaterally and frequently
updated. They are presented on websites where the primary purpose
is often recreational, and the contracting environment lacks the
formalities associated with serious, legal transactions. The terms are
neither comprehensible nor readily viewable. In short, most online
notices are not at all reasonable.187
In order to be effective, a notice should be both (1) conspicuous
and (2) easily comprehensible. Conspicuousness requires more than
large font size, bold font, or all-caps letters.188 Conspicuousness relates
to visibility and prominence. Comprehensibility means both legibility
and understandability. Text can be prominent without being
comprehensible. All-cap letters may actually make text harder to
read.189
Conspicuous notices must be placed in a “can’t miss” location
where the user would certainly see it prior to the user having engaged
in any on-site activity or incurred any sunk costs. Often, websites will
allow users to browse their website or fill out data fields before notifying
them of relevant terms. Presenting terms only after the user has
expended effort or engaged in on-site activity should be considered
ineffective notice. In practice, this means that companies should place
prominent notices in two places: at entry and at point of service. If the
website wishes the notice to be effective to all website visitors, then it
should place it at the point of entry. If the website wishes the notice to
187
On the contrary, many companies employ what Jamie Luguri and Lior
Strahilevitz refer to as “dark patterns” to manipulate and deceive consumers into
engaging in conduct which they did not intend to do, including clicking to agree to
online terms that they may not want. Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Shining
a Light on Dark Patterns, 13 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 43, 58 (2021) (noting that “there are a
variety of dark patterns that are designed to nudge consumers into contractual
arrangements that they presumably would not otherwise prefer, and these techniques
appear to be employed by a variety of different e-commerce firms”).
188
Some research suggests that all-caps may have the effect of discouraging, rather
than encouraging, reading. See Yonathan A. Arbel & Andrew Toler, All-Caps, 17 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 862, 865 (2020).
189
Id.
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be effective to only some website visitors (e.g., those who want to make
a purchase), it should be placed at the beginning of the transaction
process.
Size and scale affect the conspicuousness of notices. In the
physical world, a “No Trespassing” sign must be viewable at a distance
and visible prior to entering the premises if the business intends to
argue that the notice is effective against the visitor. A visitor who steps
onto land belonging to another would not be held to have been
notified by a “No Trespassing” sign viewable only by entering onto the
land. Similarly, in the online environment, a website that wishes to
notify all of its users must do so on the home page where the notice
must be immediately viewable without requiring the user to scroll.
Notices that only apply to certain users (such as those purchasing
goods from that website) should appear prior to the customer inputting
personal information in data fields.
An effective notice must also be in a recognizable form. In the
physical world, notices are typically placed on signs and have a
particular shape and color that communicates a message, even if the
viewer is at a distance and unable to read the text. A notice indicating
urgency and that the viewer must stop anticipated activity is typically
bordered with red and white or black lettering, or it may contain a
graphic with a red circle with a black line through it or a black circle
with a red line through the graphic.
For example:

Signs which are primarily informative are typically yellow with
black lettering, such as:
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The presentation of the notices reflects cultural understandings.
In the United States, red is associated with immediate cessation of
activity and reinforced through stop signs and traffic lights. Yellow is
associated with slowing down and acting prudently. Green signs
typically indicate permission or provide information about where a
viewer may engage in certain activity.

In addition, effective notices must be comprehensible. In both
the physical and online environments, this means that the graphics
and text must be simple, unambiguous, and limited. The use of script
should be minimal as it can be hard to read. Font styles should be
plain and limited to no more than two. The space limitations of signs
constrain the volume of content in physical notice. In the online
environment, however, digital text is not naturally constrained due to
its malleability. Companies have abused this feature by updating terms
frequently and incorporating, by reference, hyperlinked terms on
multiple pages.
Given the varying sizes and formatting configurations, the
appearance of a digital notice differs depending on the size and type
of screen. A notice on an iPhone may look different from a notice on
a desktop computer. Accordingly, specific size regulations for digital
notices are inappropriate. One size does not fit all when it comes to
digital notices due to differences in screens and operating
configurations.
Symbols and punctuation marks play an important role in
communicating notices effectively. An exclamation point signals
importance and urgency, and it increases the saliency of the notice.
Graphics communicate at a glance whether activity is permitted or
prohibited. For example, an image in a circle with a red or black line
through it indicates prohibition. Similarly, online notices should have
a recognizable form to distinguish them from other content on a
webpage. This Article proposes that they be in a shape that signals
information, such as a rectangle or square. To signify the importance
of the notice and to standardize the form, they should also have red
borders and black or white text.
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Of critical importance, effective notices must be comprehensible.
In both the physical and online environments, this means that the
graphics and text must be simple, unambiguous, and limited. The
space limitations of tangible signs constrain their content. In the
online environment, however, digital text is not naturally constrained.
Websites have abused this feature by updating terms frequently and
incorporating hyperlinked pages. Because of the lack of physical
constraints, the visual presentation of digital notices should be
regulated.
Text often diminishes, rather than enhances, the
effectiveness of a sign. Many safety signs, for example, use only images
to increase comprehensibility. The industry standard for billboards is
no more than seven words because viewers are often driving by at high
speeds.190 The industry standard for digital notices and signs is
referred to as the “3 x 5” text rule—three lines of text with five words
each or five lines of text with three words each.191 In the online
environment, this standard should be a requirement.
I am not the only commentator to propose that adhesive terms be
presented in a recognizable form. Professors Ian Ayres and Alan
Schwartz proposed that certain unexpected terms be presented in a
Their proposal is essentially an “enhanced
“warning box.”192
disclosure” approach that seeks to increase the salience of unexpected
terms to promote “informed consumer consent in a cost-effective
manner.”193 My proposal, on the other hand, discards the notion that
an online notice is a contract. Furthermore, it considers the
contextual realities that constrain genuine consent to online adhesive
terms. It places the burden on the drafter to conform to specific
drafting requirements rather than upon the adherent to read hidden

190
See Paul Suggett, Hints for a Great Billboard Advertisement, THE BALANCE CAREERS
(Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.thebalancecareers.com/six-steps-to-making-a-greatbillboard-ad-38479; Leo Rondeau, Top 10 Rules for Billboard Advertising, COLLING MEDIA
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://collingmedia.com/outdoor-advertising/top-10-rules-forbillboard-advertising.
191
See, e.g., TIPS FOR DESIGNING AND MANAGING DIGITAL SIGNAGE SYSTEMS, HB
COMMC’N & BROWN UNIV. 2, 5 (2015), https://ithelp.brown.edu/custom-images/files
/Brown_BestPractices_Final_7.22.15%20%20.pdf; 10 Rules for Designing Digital Signage
Content,
SCREENCLOUD,
https://screencloud.com/blog/rules-designing-digitalsignage (last visited Sept. 17, 2022); Top 8 Presentation Design Tips for Digital Signature,
PRESENTATIONPOINT, https://www.presentationpoint.com/blog/presentation-designtips-for-digital-signage (last visited Sept. 27, 2022).
192
See Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 553.
193
Id. at 580.
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and incomprehensible terms.
In other words, it imposes
reasonableness standards on the drafter, rather than the adherent.
My proposal reflects the view that reasonable notice should not be
confused for reasonable notice of notice. Notice of the fact that terms exist
fails to communicate what those terms mean. A viewer who views the
notice of notice (a.k.a. the terms of service hyperlink) will not know
whether the substantive terms are objectionable or benign. Multiple
clicks on an “accept” button next to a hyperlink that only states “Terms
and Conditions” does not provide the same level of information as a
click on an “accept” button next to language in bold that states “I
HEREBY WAIVE MY RIGHT TO SUE IN A COURT OF LAW.” A
notice must inform; it cannot simply direct the viewer to where the
information may be found.
The combination of the duty to read with a reasonable notice
standard is incongruous. People do not read signs; they look at them.
Graphic designers and advertisers understand this and pay careful
attention to signage location, contrast, lettering, and font. Judges,
however, typically ignore or discount the way that people attend to
signage and have conflated standards for notices with standards for
contracts. They ignore the fact that professional practices, printing
and reproduction costs, physical constraints, industry norms,
legislative requirements, and regulatory guidelines all constrain the
leeway that businesses have in drafting tangible terms.
The consequence is that digital adhesive terms overwhelm the
user and make it impossible for users to read and understand them,
especially when they are frequently updated. This contrast between
the physical and online environments makes simply transporting the
standard of “reasonable notice” to the online environment
inappropriate. Instead, I propose clear and simple requirements for
reasonable digital notices which are summarized in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Proposed Online Notice Requirements:
Red borders with white text and
black background or black text
and white background.
No more than 2 font styles.
No or minimal script/cursive.

3 lines of text, each line 5 words
maximum
-or5 lines of text, each line 3 words
maximum

If a notice fails to meet the proposed requirements, it should be
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore, ineffective.
Furthermore, the incorporation by reference doctrine should not
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apply to notices. The drafter should not have the benefit of
incorporating by reference lengthy provisions which interpret or
elaborate upon the meaning of the notice terms. Rather, the court
should interpret the terms in accordance with their ordinary meaning
and applicable rules of interpretation.
B. Anticipated Objections
I anticipate several objections to my proposals. Some may argue
that online adhesive terms should be viewed as contracts, not notices,
because people should be able to exercise their freedom and structure
their own agreements. This argument, however, assumes the
conclusion (that these terms are contracts) and thus fails to address
the actual proposal. The adhesive online terms scenario is an entirely
different one than the bargaining scenario that the “freedom of
contract” rhetoric conjures. Adhesive terms are a convenience, a
concession to the marketplace; they do not embody the autonomy
ideals of contract. Their very definition—adhesive terms—make that
clear.
Digital contracts in an online environment should be
enforceable, but not all digital adhesive terms are contracts. Adhesive
terms should not be presumed to be contracts simply because
businesses have self-servingly labeled them as such. The term
“contract” is misapplied in most cases involving online adhesive terms.
The online environment constrains user perception and attention.
Unlike the physical environment, users are hijacked by terms when
they least expect it. They visit a website to shop or read interesting
content, not with the intent of entering into a legal relationship.
Furthermore, certain terms such as mandatory arbitration and
limitation of liability clauses are similar across websites. When those
websites offer services that are necessary to thrive in modern society,
users cannot be understood to have consented.
Moreover, to presume that adhesive terms in the online
environment are notices instead of contracts is consistent with how
courts have traditionally treated adhesive terms in non-traditional
formats in the physical environment. For example, courts have found
that receipts and shipping invoices merely provide data or other
information, such as the quantity of purchased items or dates of
shipment, and are not binding as contracts.194 As one court noted,
194

India Paint & Lacquer Co. v. United Steel Prods. Corp., 267 P.2d 408, 415 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (finding that invoices were nothing more than “receipts attesting
to the delivery of merchandise” which contained “only data as to the date of shipment
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“[t]he prevailing rule is that an invoice, standing alone, is not a
contract.”195 Limitations of liability and warranty disclaimers should be
brought to the adherent’s attention before a court will find them
enforceable.196 This does not mean that it is impossible to enter into
an adhesive form contract online, but it does mean that there should
be formal requirements before one is found.
Another anticipated objection to the general proposal is that mass
consumer contracts of adhesion are efficient. This argument adopts a
narrow and biased definition of efficiency which equates it solely with
reduced transaction costs. I believe that my proposal better enhances
efficiency because it reduces the time that users must take to review
terms and that companies must take to both draft and update them. It
also increases predictability and certainty.
Some might argue that the proposed notice requirements are too
stringent and that it is difficult to communicate important terms within
the proposed limitations. There are several responses to that
argument.
First, notices should be both comprehensible and
conspicuous if they are to be enforceable. Research shows that
consumers do not read disclosures and disclaimers.197 My proposal
requires online notices to be short and conspicuous so that reading
them is unavoidable. Disclosures and disclaimers contained in fine
print or within interior pages (i.e., that require clicking on hyperlinks)
are ineffective and should not serve to protect the drafter from liability
given that consumers do not read them.
This does not, however, mean that the drafter has no rights unless
they are expressly stated in the notice. For example, assume X’s website
contains original content but does not contain a notice that states, “No
Copying Content.” Y may not copy X’s content because doing so

and the quantity of a particular item delivered to the purchaser. Their informality,
incompleteness, and lack of contractual character show on the face of the
documents”).
195
Id. at 416 (citations omitted).
196
Id. at 415 (stating that the lower court “properly refused to give effect to the
disclaimer and liability provisions . . . in the absence of it being established that they
were known by, or brought to the attention of,” the adherent); see also U.C.C. § 2-207
(AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977) (outlining when terms are part of a contract
where the transaction is governed by preprinted forms).
197
Kesten C. Green & J. Scott Armstrong, Evidence on the Effects of Mandatory
Disclaimers in Advertising, 31 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 293, 301 (2012); OMRI BEN-SHAHAR
& CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED
DISCLOSURE 10–11 (2014).
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violates X’s rights as the copyright owner.198 The absence of a notice
does not alter X’s rights or obligation to respect those rights.199
Second, even if certain terms are not included in the notice, an
implied-in-fact or implied-in-law contract may exist between a website
visitor and a business. Contextual factors, such as communications
exchanged between the website and the visitor, community standards,
and business and social norms all play a role in determining whether
parties acted fairly and reasonably.200 Existing law also constrains the
conduct of website users and prohibits them from engaging in unfair
business practices or opportunistic, bad faith, or illegal activity on the
website.
Third, my proposal only applies where a court applies a notice
standard. Digital contracts which are presented to the adherent in a
traditional contract format and which the adherent e-signs would be
subject to the same analysis as tangible contracts. Agreements sent via
Docusign or other contract software management systems that are
presented as traditional paper contracts (and not notices) and digitally
signed would be subject to traditional contract rules. Thus, the
determination of whether such a contract was validly formed requires
analyzing whether there was offer and acceptance, mutual assent, and
consideration201 Electronic contracts would also be subject to the
standard contract defenses to enforceability, such as mistake, fraud,
and unconscionability.202 In other words, the mere fact that contracts

198

Presuming that X is the author of and owns the copyright to the content posted
on X’s website.
199
It may, however, affect whether Y can be found of intentional infringement.
200
See Hercules Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 424 (1996) (noting that an
agreement in in fact is inferred “from conduct of the parties showing, the light of the
surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding” and an agreement implied in
law is a “fiction of law” which is “imputed to perform a legal duty”); In re Ambry
Genetics Data Breach Litigation, 567 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1144 (2021) (finding an
implied contract by defendants to protect personal information even though no
explicit promises were made because “it is difficult to imagine how, in our day and age
of data and identity theft, the mandatory receipt of Social Security numbers or other
sensitive personal information would not imply the recipient’s assent to protect the
information sufficiently”); Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 762
(2015) (noting that “when a plaintiff alleges unjust enrichment, a court may ‘construe
the cause of action as a quasi-contract claim seeking restitution’”).
201
By contrast, purchase orders submitted through electronic systems would be
treated as forms under U.C.C. section 2-207.
202
See e.g., 27 TENN. PRAC. CONTS. LAW § 1.10. Defenses to contract enforcement
(“There are numerous defenses to contract enforcement” and including unilateral
and mutual mistake, fraud, and unconscionability among others.”).
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are presented and signed electronically would not undermine their
enforceability because their contractual nature is readily apparent.
Accordingly, they would not be treated as online notices. Instead, they
would be treated as paper contracts subject to the traditional doctrinal
rules of formation and enforcement.
Finally, and most importantly, my proposals are default
requirements, meaning that they are the rules that apply in the
Businesses can still marshal their
absence of regulation.203
considerable forces to lobby legislators for alternate and additional
terms. My proposed regulations are intended to serve as a default in
the absence of governmental regulation. They are not intended to
override or supplant existing or future statutes or governmental
regulations.
By providing guidance to courts in assessing whether “reasonable
notice” or “conspicuousness” standards are met in the online
environment, these proposals simplify the rules surrounding digital
adhesive terms. They suggest a way to standardize and regulate
adhesive online terms in the absence of regulation. Thus, my proposal
encourages and accelerates the democratic process rather than
supplanting it. Rather than allowing companies to privately legislate
legal gaps, it requires them to obtain the buy-in of elected
representatives and appointed regulators. As Professor James Gibson
has argued, rather than accepting the validity of boilerplate terms, the
issues they address “should be debated in courts and legislatures, not
resolved through veiled, unilateral action by a self-interested party.”204
My proposal essentially forces companies to disclose their business
practices in a public forum instead of in fine print that nobody reads.
Some may object that my proposal is actually too mild and does
not do enough to remedy the scourge of adhesive contracting. I
certainly agree that more can be done in this area. I also believe,
however, that regulating the form of adhesive terms has important
advantages over focusing simply on the substance of these terms.
New technologies will undoubtedly create new legal gaps and
necessitate legislative attention to new adhesive terms. Just as soon as

203
As James Gibson has argued, rather than enforcing boilerplate terms such as
class action waivers, the issue should be confronted “head-on.” See James Gibson,
Boilerplate’s False Dichotomy, 106 GEO. L.J. 249, 276–77 (2018) (“Indeed, dragging the
issue out of the shadow of boilerplate tees it up for a truly public vetting, which can
solve the class action problem for all businesses, not just for those with the ability and
foresight to promulgate boilerplate waivers.”).
204
Id. at 277.
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a regulation is passed prohibiting one practice, technology enables
another one to crop up. Fine print grants legal cover for the dubious
new business practice (e.g., data collection) while bypassing public
attention until that practice becomes entrenched and normalized.
Legislators, consumer advocates, and regulators then play catch up to
address the negative social and economic consequences from the
dubious practice, which becomes much more difficult given the
lobbying and economic power of private industry groups and large
corporations which now depend upon it (this is essentially what has
happened with online privacy and explains the years of stalled privacy
legislation).205 Lather-rinse-repeat. Regulating the form of adhesive
terms is one way to step out of this cycle. My proposal shifts the burden
of seeking legislative action upon businesses who would have to fight
for terms they want, rather than forcing consumers to fight to avoid
terms they do not want.
The overarching objective of my proposals is to catalyze active
public deliberation and motivate legislative action around dubious
business practices. My proposal does not require companies to
disclose all their business practices or notify users of every potential
violation. The notice requirement applies only where businesses seek
the protection or advantages that notices provide. Furthermore, as
previously explained, even in the absence of a notice or express terms,
businesses may be able to raise claims based on equity or implied
contracts to defend their ownership rights or business practices from
opportunistic or bad faith users. 206
V. CONCLUSION
Adhesive contracts generate harms that do more than distort
doctrine—they reverberate throughout society. Companies like
Google and Facebook used them to justify privacy-eroding business
practices such as email scanning and data collection.207 The
proliferation of adhesive terms undermines rights and diminishes
205

Thorin Klosowski, The State of Consumer Data Privacy Laws in the US (And Why It
Matters), N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/blog/stateof-privacy-laws-in-us.
206
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
207
In re Google, No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918, at *12 (“Google
contends that by agreeing to its Terms of Service and Privacy Policies, all Gmail users
have consented to Google reading their emails.”); In re Facebook, Inc., 402 F. Supp.
3d 767, 777 (2019) (Facebook argued that lawsuit based on privacy invasion must be
dismissed “because Facebook users consented, in fine print, to the wide dissemination
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individual freedoms.208
Adhesive contracts containing forced
arbitration clauses stifle constitutional rights to speech and to a jury
trial.209 Uber and Lyft’s use of adhesive contracts helped justify the
recharacterization of employment in a way that provided fewer
benefits for the worker.210 Adhesive contracts also played a role in the
gradual transformation of the nature of commercial exchanges from
sales to licenses, a change which has important consequences for
private property ownership and the future of innovation.211
Furthermore, to frame adhesive terms as “contracts” permits
drafting businesses the power to enforce onerous provisions in an
unequal manner, giving them cover when they discriminate. While
some have argued that the allocation of power should be in favor of
the drafter to guard against opportunistic consumers,212 the discretion
accorded to drafters allows them to discriminate against adherents
based on race, income, and other categories that are otherwise
protected under the law. Professor Manisha Padi, for example, has
observed that unlike other areas of law, contract law “traditionally
authorized contracting parties to treat social groups differently[]”
resulting in disparate impacts for which there is no legal recourse.213
Similarly, Professor Danielle Kie Hart has noted that “[a]t the heart of
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most of the systemic problems currently confronting individuals and
businesses is quite literally a contract.”214
The emphasis on the “efficiency” of standard contracts ignores
the purpose of contracts.215 Contracts are tools of the economy, and
the sole function of the economy is not to improve efficiency. As the
economist Jeffrey Sachs observed “[t]hough efficiency is a great virtue,
it is not the only economic goal of interest to the society. Economic
fairness is also crucial.”216
Moreover, adhesive online contracts are actually inefficient. While
the adhesiveness of paper standard form contracts may have resulted
in cost savings, streamlined transactions, and consistent, predictable
terms, these benefits are lacking with their digital versions.
Digitization has made it easy to revise terms, increasing the time that
drafters spend modifying them and that adherents are expected to
spend reading them. For businesses, contract management has
become an increasingly complex and expensive affair. Even the name
“standard form” is misleading when drafters frequently update the
formats and presentation of adhesive terms to accommodate different
screens. In addition to being burdensome to the adherents, the
enforceability of digital adhesive terms is highly unpredictable, and
drafters are often unsuccessful when they seek to enforce their
agreements.217 The excessive use of digital terms may even have
unintended consequences, ensnaring the drafter who may be unable
to track and control all of them.218
214
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Finally, my proposal recognizes the reality of the political process.
Firms, especially those in the same industry, are better able than
consumers to use the law to their advantage. They have the resources
to organize around a unifying interest. They belong to industry
specific trade groups and professional organizations that lobby
politicians to protect and promote their interests. They do not suffer
the same coordination and collective action problems that plague
consumers. If businesses in a given industry are unhappy with
standards governing how they must present notices, they are in a better
position than consumers to lobby their legislators to provide more
concrete guidelines and different regulations. They can push for
legislation that expressly permits certain practices and exempts those
practices from disclosure or consent requirements. Attorneys for large
corporations and industry trade groups are typically well-paid and
sophisticated, with an arsenal of legal arguments that makes them wellequipped to defend and promote their clients’ interests. Consumers,
by contrast, are not as well-resourced or organized to position and
mobilize in the same way that businesses are.
Thus, the presumption that adhesive terms are notices and not
contracts would enhance the benefits of standard form contracting in
a more even-handed way. The proposed default notice standard with
minimum requirements takes the legislative power of adhesive terms
away from a private business and places it into the hands of those who
should have it—not businesses or special interest groups, but the
legislators and policymakers who represent and consider the needs of
all members of society.

